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Abstract: The world economy has experienced four global recessions over the past seven 
decades: in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. During each of these episodes, annual real per 
capita global GDP contracted, and this contraction was accompanied by weakening of 
other key indicators of global economic activity. The global recessions were highly 
synchronized internationally, with severe economic and financial disruptions in many 
countries around the world. The 2009 global recession, set off by the global financial crisis, 
was by far the deepest and most synchronized of the four recessions. As the epicenter of 
the crisis, advanced economies felt the brunt of the recession. The subsequent expansion 
has been the weakest in the post-war period in advanced economies as many of them have 
struggled to overcome the legacies of the crisis. In contrast, most emerging market and 
developing economies weathered the 2009 global recession relatively well and delivered a 
stronger recovery than after previous global recessions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Global recession” has been a recurrent topic of debate over the past decade, reflecting 
the breadth and severity of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, the halting nature of the 
recovery, and recently, fears that the global economy was on the edge of another 
downturn. In 2009, the interest was understandably focused on the severity of the global 
recession and its devastating consequences. Attention shifted to the signs of a flourishing 
global recovery in 2010-11, but hopes that this would be sustained were soon curtailed by 
the possibility of another global recession due to the euro area debt crisis. Financial 
pressures in the euro area eased in late 2012, but in 2015-16 fears of a global recession 
reemerged partly because of financial market turbulence in China. Since mid-2018, 
concerns about a global recession have returned as the world economy experienced a 
synchronized slowdown largely driven by extraordinary weakness in trade and 
manufacturing amid elevated trade tensions and heightened policy uncertainties (Figure 
1). 
 
Despite the interest in global recessions, the term does not have a widely accepted 
definition. It is difficult to map the most practical definition of national recessions—at 
least two consecutive quarters of decline in national output—to a global context, not only 
because reliable quarterly data for global output are unavailable without a significant lag, 
but also because the global economy rarely registers a contraction: 2009 was the only year 
in the post-war period to register a decline in annual global output. 
 
A better understanding of global recessions requires an appreciation of the growing 
importance of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) and of cross-border 
trade and financial linkages. First, the increasing role of EMDEs means that it is no longer 
sufficient to monitor cyclical fluctuations in advanced economies, the United States in 
particular, to understand the global business cycle. Advanced economies on average 
accounted for about 80 percent of global output and 75 percent of global growth over the 
period 1950-1990 (Figure 2). However, by the 2010s, the average share of the advanced 
economies in world output had declined to around 60 percent and their contribution to 
world output growth had fallen to about 40 percent (in market exchange rates). As a 
result, business cycles in advanced economies have become a much less reliable proxy 
indicator for the global business cycle. This implies that a better understanding of the 
global business cycle requires going beyond the usual set of advanced economies to a much 
broader group that also includes EMDEs. 
 
Second, cross-border trade and financial linkages have become stronger over the past seven 
decades. In the 1950s, global trade openness—measured by the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services in percent of global GDP—was on average less than 20 percent 
(Figure 3). By the 2010s, it had increased to more than 55 percent. Global financial 
openness, defined as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities in percent of GDP, also 
increased, from around 50 percent in the 1970s to almost 400 percent in the latest decade. 
These stronger linkages have increased the feedback, in both directions, between business 
cycles in advanced economies and those in EMDEs. They also ultimately raise the odds 
of more pronounced, and more synchronous, movements in the global business cycle. 
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Against this background, this paper examines the main features of global recessions and 
the ensuing recoveries and expansions. Specifically, it addresses three questions. First, 
what happens during global recessions and recoveries? Second, how do global recessions 
and recoveries vary across different groups of countries, particularly advanced economies, 
EMDEs, and low-income countries (LICs)? Third, what happens during global expansions 
and how the current global expansion compares with previous ones. 
 
The paper builds on an extensive literature on various aspects of global and national 
business cycles.1 A branch of this research documents the growing importance of global 
business cycles in explaining national cycles (e.g., Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003, 2008; 
and Mumtaz, Simonelli, and Surico 2011). A second branch focuses on the roles played 
by trade and financial linkages in the cross-border transmission of business cycles.2 A 
third branch studies the turning points of the global business cycle and its phases.3 
 
Our study is closely related to Kose and Terrones (2015; KT going forward) which 
presented the first detailed account of global recessions. KT mostly focused on global 
recessions and recoveries using annual data for 163 countries over 1960-2012. They 
presented a detailed review of the relevant literature, analyzed how financial crises lead 
to recessions, and examined the interactions between global and national cycles. KT’s 
work builds on Rogoff, Robinson, and Bayoumi (2002), which briefly examined whether 
the 2001 worldwide downturn was a global recession. Rogoff, Robinson, and Bayoumi 
(2002) focused on movements in per capita GDP growth to identify episodes that could 
be labeled as global recessions. They emphasized the importance of statistical and 
judgmental approaches to identify the turning points of the global business cycle. 
 
This paper extends the literature in four dimensions. First, it covers a longer time span 
of annual series (1950-2019) and a larger set of economies (180). Second, it is the first 
study that presents an analysis of the phases of the global business cycle with quarterly 
output series of 106 countries over the period 1960:1-2019:3. Third, it expands on the set 
of macroeconomic and financial variables that KT analyzed to present a broader 
perspective on the evolution of the global business cycle. Specifically, it analyzes the 
behavior of confidence, uncertainty, and measures of global financial conditions that have 
recently attracted increasing attention in research and policy circles. Fourth, it presents 
a detailed analysis of global expansions and puts the current global expansion in context 
by comparing it with previous such episodes. 
 
This study, like KT, employs global real GDP per capita to track movements in the global 
business cycle. This variable is a primary indicator of global well-being that takes into 
account variations in population growth rates over time and across countries. 
 
                                                 
1 Most of the earlier studies in the literature focused on the dependence of EMDEs on advanced economies (e.g., Currie 
and Vines 1988; Chui et al. 2002). Zarnowitz (1992) reviews earlier research program on business cycle fluctuations 
across countries. In addition, there are studies that try to forecast global growth, for example, Cuba-Borda, Mechanick, 
and Raffo (2018); Ferrara and Marcilli (2019); Golinelli and Parigi (2014); and Rossiter (2010). 
2 For details on these studies, see Kose and Yi (2006); di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010); di Giovanni, Levchenko, and 
Mejean (2018); and Diebold and Yilmaz (2015). 
3 For details on this work, see Kose and Terrones (2015); Camacho and Martinez-Martin (2015); and Martínez-García, 
Grossman, and Mack (2015). 
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Turning points of the global business cycle are identified by means of two methods widely 
used in the analysis of national business cycles: a statistical method and a judgmental 
method. The former defines a global recession as taking place when there is a decline in 
annual global real GDP per capita. The judgmental method, similar to the method used 
for the United States by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), considers whether there is strong evidence for a broad-based 
decline in multiple key indicators of global economic activity in a given year. This paper 
focuses on six main global activity indicators: real GDP per capita, industrial production, 
trade, capital flows, oil consumption, and employment. These two methods together 
provide an intuitively appealing characterization of the turning points of the global 
business cycle and translate into a concrete definition of a global recession. 
 
For the purposes of this study, and following KT, a global recession is defined as a 
contraction in global real GDP per capita accompanied by a broad decline in various other 
measures of global activity. The definition of a global recovery also closely follows the 
standard definition used in the context of national business cycles. The recovery phase is 
the period after the trough and defined here as the one- or three-year period following the 
trough of the cycle. The recovery is thus the earlier part of the expansion phase, which 
refers to the whole period between two recessions. 
 
Main findings of this paper are as follows. 
 
Global recessions. In the seventy years since 1950, the world economy has experienced 
four global recessions: in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. In each of these episodes, there was 
a contraction in annual real per capita global GDP and broad-based weakness in other 
key indicators of global economic activity. These episodes were highly synchronized 
internationally, involving severe economic and financial disruptions in many countries 
around the world. The 2009 global recession was by far the deepest and most synchronized 
episode among the four.  
 
Global recoveries. A global recovery usually involves a broad-based rebound in 
macroeconomic and financial activity. Among the four episodes, the strongest recovery 
occurred after the 1975 recession. Thanks to large, prompt, and globally coordinated 
policy support, the recovery following the 2009 recession was the second strongest episode. 
 
Impact across country groups and regions. The impact of global recessions varied across 
different groups of countries. Average per capita growth declined more in advanced 
economies than EMDEs during global recessions. LICs on average suffered larger declines 
in per capita growth than the average EMDE. The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) and 
South Asia (SAR) regions even continued expanding during global recessions. However, 
the other four EMDE regions, particularly those with more reliance on exports of 
industrial commodities, experienced per capita output declines. 
 
Relatively good performance of EMDEs through the latest global recession. As the 
epicenter of the financial crisis, advanced economies felt the brunt of the 2009 global 
recession. In contrast, EMDE output growth remained positive during the recession, and 
EMDEs delivered a stronger recovery post-2009 than after any of the three previous 
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episodes. LICs were able to continue growing during the most recent global recession 
whereas their per capita growth had plummeted in the previous episodes. 
 
Global expansions. The duration of the global expansions varied, with a minimum of six 
years (following the 1975 recession) and a maximum of 17 years (following the 1991 
recession). The latest global expansion registered average per capita growth comparable 
with that of previous episodes. The post-2009 expansion was the weakest of the four in 
advanced economies, as many of them struggled to overcome the legacies of the global 
financial crisis. Among the EMDEs, the recovery of per capita output growth has been 
exceptionally robust, despite a gradual slowdown after 2012. 
 
Policies. Monetary and fiscal policies often became expansionary going into global 
recessions, and they typically supported the ensuing global recoveries. Following the 2009 
global recession, monetary policy remained highly accommodative for most of the 2010s, 
with advanced economy central banks introducing a wide range of unconventional 
measures to ease credit. However, after the initial implementation of large, coordinated, 
fiscal stimulus programs during 2008-09, advanced economies withdrew fiscal support, out 
of concerns for the growth of public debt, and government expenditures fell after 2010. 
By contrast, EMDEs have generally employed expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
during the current expansion, while adjusting the settings of their monetary policy 
instruments in response to cyclical conditions. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the database and 
methodology. This is followed by a discussion of the identification of the turning points 
of the global business cycle and a summary of the main events associated with each global 
recession. Section 4 documents the main features of global recessions, recoveries and 
expansions. The last section concludes with a discussion of results and future research 
directions. 
 
2. Identification of turning points of the global business cycle  
 
2.1. Database 
 
Multiple data sources are employed to construct world GDP growth at annual and 
quarterly frequencies over a long period. The annual GDP series covers 180 countries—
36 advanced economies and 144 EMDEs—over the period 1950-2019, though the country 
sample size varies by year.4 The quarterly series covers 106 countries over the period 
1960:1-2019:3.5 Appendix 1 presents the list of countries used to compute global growth. 
In addition to data on GDP growth, a wide range of measures of global economic and 
financial activity are employed.6 Indicators of economic activity include trade, industrial 
                                                 
4 Data for 2019 are estimates. Annual growth forecasts for 2020 are included in the database. All estimates and forecasts 
are from the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report published in January 2020, which covers 180 countries 
(World Bank 2020). 
5 The quarterly data collected begin in 1950:1, but data availability is quite limited during the 1950s, so data prior to 
1960 were excluded. 
6 For these series, estimates are also used for 2019. Whenever data series at higher frequencies (e.g., monthly or 
quarterly) are available, they are used to compute 2019 series.  
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production, unemployment, and oil consumption. Financial variables include capital flows, 
credit, equity and house prices, inflation, short-term nominal and real interest rates, and 
an index of broad financial conditions. In light of their roles in determining activity, some 
additional series, such as indicators of uncertainty and confidence, are also examined. 
Appendix 2 includes a summary of all variables in the database with their definitions, 
coverage, and sources. 
 
The main measure of the global business cycle is the growth rate of world real GDP per 
capita.7 Real GDP per capita is considered as a primary measure of average economic 
well-being since it takes into account differences in population growth. The difference 
between per capita GDP growth rates in advanced economies and EMDEs is generally 
smaller than the difference between their aggregate GDP growth rates.8 
 
The growth rate of world real GDP is a weighted average of national real GDP growth 
rates. Two types of weights are employed: market exchange rate weights and purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) weights. The baseline results refer to market exchange rate weights, 
which are calculated as national GDP measured in domestic currencies, converted into 
U.S. dollar terms using market exchange rates, as a share of world GDP in U.S. dollar 
terms. Global trade and transactions in financial markets are conducted at market 
exchange rates, and the baseline specification uses this weighting scheme. 
 
PPP exchange rates are calculated as the rates at which the currency of one country 
would have to be converted into another to equalize the values of a common and broadly 
defined basket of goods and services. PPP exchange rates differ from market exchange 
rates particularly because goods and services that are not traded internationally tend to 
be cheaper in lower-income countries than in higher-income countries. As a result, the 
value of output in lower-income countries tends to be relatively greater using PPP than 
using market exchange rates (Callen 2007). Thus, PPP weights, which are calculated as 
national GDP valued at PPP as a share of world GDP, tend to be higher for lower-income 
countries than market exchange rate weights. As growth in lower-income countries tends 
to be greater than that in higher-income countries, global GDP growth is often higher 
with PPP weights than with market weights.9 
 
For measuring living standards and aggregating welfare, PPP weights are more 
appropriate since they capture the amount of consumption affordable to households for 
comparable consumption baskets. While PPP weights capture the fact that some goods 
are cheaper in lower income countries, market rates capture how much an economy could 
                                                 
7 Hamilton (2019) develops a monthly indicator of global activity, based on industrial production of countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) plus Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian 
Federation, and South Africa. 
8 Over the period 1950-2019, average GDP growth rate was 3.3 percent for advanced economies and 4.7 percent for 
EMDEs. Population growth in EMDEs (1.8 percent) was also higher than in advanced economies (0.8 percent) over 
1950-2019. Per capita output growth was then, on average, 2.4 percent in advanced economies and 2.8 percent in 
EMDEs. 
9 For example, the average annual growth rate of world GDP over the period 1950-2019 was 3.7 percent or 4.0 percent, 
using market weights and PPP weights, respectively. Average annual global GDP growth over the past 20 years was 
2.9 percent with market weights and 3.7 percent with PPP weights. In per capita terms, average annual GDP growth 
was 1.7 percent with market weights and 2.5 percent with PPP weights. 
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“buy” in global markets. Hence, market exchange rate-based weights are used here to 
provide the baseline measure of economic size (Cooper 2014; Frankel 2014). 
 
2.2. Methodology 
 
Two approaches are employed to identify the turning points of the global business cycle: 
a statistical method and a judgmental method. The methods are complementary but 
employ different information sets. Both follow the “classical” definition of a business cycle 
(Burns and Mitchell 1946), under which business cycle expansions are marked by increases 
in many measures of economic activity, and contractions by broad declines in activity. 
Both are widely used in the context of national business cycles, and often arrive at similar 
turning points. 
 
Statistical Method. The statistical dating method used here was introduced by Harding 
and Pagan (2002).10 The method is convenient since the turning points identified are 
robust to the inclusion of newly available data. The method makes it possible to identify 
global recessions, defined as taking place when the annual growth rate of per capita global 
real GDP is negative. However, per capita real GDP growth alone may not be sufficient 
as an indicator of the cyclical evolution of economic activity. For this reason, the Business 
Cycle Dating Committees of the U.S. NBER and the Europe-based CEPR (Centre for 
Economic Policy Research) employ broad sets of economic indicators and apply a 
“judgmental method” to identify the turning points of national or regional cycles. 
 
Judgmental Method. This method involves analyzing a broad set of macroeconomic 
indicators and reaching a judgment on whether the evidence points to expansion or 
recession. The NBER uses this method to determine the dates of cyclical turning points, 
expansions, and recessions in the U.S. economy, and the CEPR does so for the euro area. 
The NBER examines, for example, movements in real GDP, industrial production, retail 
sales, employment, and disposable income; it states that “[the] Committee does not have 
a fixed definition of economic activity.” Because different indicators can exhibit conflicting 
signals about the direction of activity, the judgmental method may not be straightforward 
to apply in real time. The CEPR’s task may be considered even more complex than that 
of the NBER since it has to determine cyclical conditions in the multi-country context of 
the euro area. 
 
The judgmental method is applied at the global level through analysis of a selected set of 
indicators of global activity—movements in real GDP per capita, industrial production, 
trade, capital flows, oil consumption, and unemployment. Some of the variables used by 
the NBER and CEPR are not available for a large enough number of countries over a 
sufficiently long period. However, the measures employed here capture the essentials of 
the information supplied by the country-specific variables used by these institutions. 
Moreover, they provide a reasonably comprehensive perspective on the evolution of the 
                                                 
10 This method extends the algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan (1971), to identify the turning points in the log 
of per capita GDP (see details in Appendix 3). It is widely used to identify the turning points of business and financial 
cycles (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2009, 2011, and 2012; Pagan and Sossounov 2003; Harding and Pagan 2016; 
Herman, Igan, and Solé 2017; Meller and Metiu 2017; Grjebine, Szczerbowicz, and Tripier 2018). Other methodologies 
consider how a variable fluctuates around its trend but the estimation of trend is sensitive to sample period. 
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global business cycle. In addition to the standard activity measures, such as GDP, 
industrial production, and unemployment, other variables capture the changes in global 
commerce and finance (trade and capital flows), and global energy consumption (oil 
consumption). 
 
Using these two methods, a global recession is defined as an annual contraction in world 
real per capita GDP accompanied by a broad decline in various other measures of global 
economic activity. A global recession begins just after the world economy reaches a peak 
of activity and ends when it reaches its trough. The recovery is defined as the early part 
of the expansion phase.11 The recovery phase is often considered as the first year following 
the trough of the business cycle, but to obtain a broader understanding, developments in 
the first three years following a global recession are also examined here. The global 
expansion phase is the period between the end of one recession and the beginning of the 
next one. 
 
3. Global Recessions and Recoveries: Dates and Events 
 
3.1. Turning Points of the Global Business Cycle 
 
Global Recessions. The baseline statistical method identifies four declines (troughs) in 
annual real global per capita GDP, using market exchange rate weights, since 1950—in 
1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009 (Figure 4). The use of PPP weights rather than market 
exchange rate weights does not affect the dates of the troughs. However, with market 
exchange rate weights, which are tilted toward advanced economies, global per capita 
GDP growth is lower especially during global recessions when many advanced economies 
experience synchronized contractions in activity (Figure 5). With both sets of weights, 
the dates of peaks in the global business cycle are found to be 1974, 1981, 1990, and 2008, 
with the annual data showing each global recession lasting just one year.12 
 
Some employ a definition of global recession that relies on a simple threshold (The 
Economist 2001, 2008). The findings here suggest that it is misleading to employ a simple 
growth threshold (such as below 2.5 percent annual growth in global GDP) to identify 
global recessions. For example, if one assumes that a global recession takes place whenever 
world real GDP growth with market (PPP) weights is less than 2.5 percent, there are 17 
(11) global recessions over the period 1950-2019 (Figure 5). If per capita growth rates 
with market (PPP) weights are used and the threshold is 1 percent, then 14 (11) global 
recessions are identified over the same period. The annual growth of world real GDP needs 
                                                 
11 In the context of national cycles, a number of studies examine the dynamics of recoveries (see Eckstein and Sinai 
1986; Balke and Wynne 1995; Mussa 2009; Stock and Watson 2012; Bec, Bouabdallah, and Ferrara 2015; Graetz and 
Michaels 2017). Some studies focus on business cycles of sub-national entities, such as U.S. states (Owyang, Piger, and 
Wall 2005; Francis, Jackson, and Owyang 2018). Hausmann, Rodríguez, and Wagner (2006) define the recovery as the 
time it takes for output to rebound from its trough to its peak level before the recession, while Cerra, Panizza, and 
Saxena (2013) assume that the recovery as the year of positive growth immediately after a sequence of years with 
negative growth. Others associate the recovery with growth achieved after a certain time period, such as four or six 
quarters, following the trough (Sichel 1994; Calderón and Fuentes 2014). 
12 This finding echoes the results from the literature on national recessions. For example, Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 
(2012) report that the average duration of roughly 250 recessions in advanced economies and EMDEs since 1960 is 
about one year. 
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to fall below 1.1 percent to register a contraction in per capita GDP given the population 
growth in 2019, but, of course, population growth is time variant with substantial changes 
from one decade to another.13 
 
The judgmental method is applied at the global level by looking at movements in several 
indicators of global activity—real GDP per capita, industrial production, trade, capital 
flows, oil consumption, and employment. This method also results in the same four dates 
as the years of global recessions: most of these indicators point to an obvious contraction 
in global economic activity in these years, after a peak in the preceding year. The behavior 
of the indicators during the global recessions is discussed below. 
 
The turning points of the global business cycle identified using the quarterly data are 
consistent with those from the annual data series. The statistical approach identifies four 
global recessions in the quarterly series since 1960: 1974:1-1975:1, 1981:4-1982:4, 1990:4-
1991:1, and 2008:3-2009:1 (Figure 6; Table 1). With the quarterly data, the average 
duration of global recessions was slightly less than one year. In addition to these four 
recession episodes, global per capita output contracted in 1970:4 (-0.7 percent), 1980:2 (-
4.8 percent), 1981:2 (-0.3 percent), 1998:1 (-0.2 percent), and 2001:3 (-0.5 percent).14 These 
contractions lasted for only a quarter without translating into global recessions. However, 
some of these short-lived global contractions were associated with recessions in major 
economies that took place ahead of global recessions (1982) or coincided with global 
downturns (1998 and 2001), as discussed below.15 
 
Global downturns. In addition to the four global recessions, the global economy 
experienced low growth in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 2012: in these four years, the global 
economy registered its lowest growth rates of the past seven decades, except for the years 
of global recession and the two years before and after each of them.16 World output per 
capita grew by slightly less than 1 percent a year, on average, over these four downturns 
(Table 2). These downturns fall short of qualifying as global recessions because world real 
GDP per capita did not contract and there was no broad-based weakness in multiple 
indicators of global activity. 
 
In 1958, global growth was weak because of low growth or outright recessions in several 
major economies, including the United States and some European economies (Federal 
                                                 
13 Global population growth has slowed by 0.7 percentage point since the 1950s to 1.2 percent a year over 2010-19. 
14 Global quarterly per capita growth is measured as the difference between quarter-on-quarter annualized growth of 
seasonally-adjusted real GDP, aggregated with market weights, and annual population growth (Appendix 2). 
15 The United States experienced a recession in 1969:4-1970:4 with per capita GDP contracting by more than 5 percent 
in 1970:4. This also coincided with a recession in Japan (with per capita growth dropped to negative 2.7 percent). Per 
capita output in the Unites States contracted by around 9 percent in 1980:2 while a number of advanced economies 
also experienced contractions, including Japan (with a contraction in per capita output by around 4 percent) and the 
United Kingdom (with a decline by around 8 percent). Over 1960-2019, world per capita output growth was close to 
but above zero in several quarters. These were due to contractions in some major economies, for example in 1960:4 
(contraction in the United States with expansions in other major economies); 1963:1 (contractions in France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands); 1987:1 (Germany); and 1989:2 (Japan). 
16 The statistical method identifies the local minimum in each episode. There were years in which global growth was 
lower than in the years of global downturns, but those years were always within two years before or after these recession 
and downturn episodes (e.g., 1980). 
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Reserve Board 1958; United Nations 1959).17 In the United States, monetary policy was 
tightened to control inflation (Eckstein and Sinai 1986; Romer and Romer 2012). In some 
European countries, also, domestic demand weakened as policy measures to contain 
inflationary pressures were implemented. However, growth remained resilient in other 
parts of the world. 
 
In 1997-98, economic activity in many EMDEs, particularly those in Asia, weakened 
sharply. In fact, the global economy experienced a contraction in per capita GDP in 1998:1 
as the East Asian financial crisis took a heavy toll on emerging market economies in the 
region. However, the world economy did not experience a recession in 1998 because growth 
in advanced economies held up. 
 
In 2001, many advanced economies experienced mild slowdowns or recessions: global per 
capita output declined in 2001:3, when per capita growth turned negative in a number of 
advanced economies, including the United States (-2.7 percent, annualized) and Japan (-
4.2 percent, annualized). However, growth in some major EMDEs, such as China and 
India, remained robust, helping the global economy escape a recession.  
 
The 2012 global downturn was mainly driven by the euro area debt crisis.18 Although 
world per capita output did not contract in any of the quarters of 2012, growth was very 
low (0.4 percent in 2012:2). The global economy was supported by growth in the United 
States and some major EMDEs. 
 
During these four global downturns, the behavior of other global indicators was mixed, 
again implying that these episodes do not qualify as global recessions. For example, 
industrial production, trade, and consumption did not suggest a broad-based weakness in 
the global economy in 1998. In 2001, although industrial production fell and the rate of 
global unemployment picked up slightly—and although equity prices and business 
confidence declined sharply and policy uncertainty increased significantly following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks—both global trade flows and oil consumption continued increasing. 
During the 2012 global downturn, some activity indicators did not show much weakness, 
but capital flows slowed, equity prices collapsed, and inflation declined. 
 
In 2019, the performance of the global economy looked somewhat similar to the previous 
global downturns. The current estimates suggest that global output growth in 2019 was 
lower than that in 1998 and 2012 but still higher than that in 1958 and 2001 (Appendix 
4). However, when measured in per capita terms, estimated growth in 2019 was higher 
than that in any of the four global downturns. Although global labor markets were tight, 
global trade was quite weak in 2019. Since the available data for the full year are mostly 
                                                 
17 In 1958, per capita GDP contracted in the United States (by 2.4 percent), Canada (by 1 percent), and several 
European countries (e.g., Belgium, by 1.2 percent; the Netherlands, by 2.4 percent; Switzerland, by 3.5 percent; the 
United Kingdom, by 0.1 percent). However, per capita growth was strong in other parts of the world, including Australia 
(4.6 percent), Germany (3.7 percent), Italy (4.1 percent), and Japan (5.3 percent). 
18 Some euro area countries experienced financial crisis (Greece in 2012 and Cyprus in 2011-13) and some others (Ireland 
and Portugal) went through periods of fiscal distress (Laeven and Valencia 2018; Medas et al. 2018). A number of other 
euro area countries also registered relatively low economic growth during this period. The euro area recorded its lowest 
output growth (-0.9 percent) since 2009. Indeed, CEPR identifies the period 2011:3 to 2013:1 as a recession in the area. 
10 
estimates at the time of writing this paper, it is not possible to conclude whether the year 
2019 constituted a global downturn.  
 
The U.S. economy during global recessions and downturns. Although the four global 
recessions coincided with recessions in the United States, not every U.S. recession was 
associated with a global recession. In fact, the United States experienced six additional 
recessions during 1950-2019, including recessions in 1958 and 2001 that coincided with 
global downturns. But it grew strongly during the 1998 global downturn and, to a lesser 
extent, during the 2012 global downturn.19 
 
3.2. Events Surrounding the Global Recessions 
 
The four global recessions identified above were all characterized by severe economic and 
financial disruptions in many countries around the world. But each recession had its own 
unique features.20 In particular, the shocks that contributed to the global recessions were 
different. The 1975 global recession was driven mainly by a global supply shock—the oil 
price shock of 1973-74. The 1982 episode followed a series of shocks, including the oil price 
shock of 1979; the subsequent rise in global inflation; monetary policy responses to that 
increase in inflation, especially the marked monetary tightening by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve; and the Latin American debt crisis. 
 
However, there are also similarities across the global recessions, including in their origins. 
A number of countries experienced financial crises during the four global recessions.21 In 
the 1991 global recession, a wide range of national shocks were transmitted across borders, 
including financial disruptions and exchange rate crises in some advanced economies, 
especially in Europe, and a major shift in political and economic systems in many Eastern 
European countries. The 2009 episode originated mainly from problems in the U.S. 
financial sector that started to become evident in 2007. These problems rapidly 
propagated to other advanced economies and some EMDEs through trade and financial 
linkages. 
 
The global recession of 1975 followed the shock to world oil prices from the Arab oil 
embargo initiated in October 1973. Although the embargo ended in March 1974, the 
supply shock and associated sharp rise in oil prices triggered a substantial increase in 
inflation and a significant weakening of growth in a number of countries. Monetary and 
fiscal policy easing, especially by some major advanced economies, helped spur a rebound 
of growth in 1976. However, the Group of Seven countries except for Germany and 
                                                 
19 Average per capita GDP growth in the United States during the global recessions and global downturns identified 
above was -2.1 percent and 0.6 percent a year, respectively. While U.S. per capita output contracted in the 1958 global 
downturn (by 2.4 percent) and was virtually stable in 2001, it expanded in 1998 and 2012 (by 3.2 percent in the former 
case and 1.4 percent in the latter). 
20 The events surrounding these episodes are discussed in detail by Knoop (2004), Allen (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), Kose and Terrones (2015), and Kose et al. (2020). Barsky and Kilian (2004), Hamilton (2013), and Baffes et al. 
(2015) present surveys of the history of oil shocks and the associated economic downturns. 
21 Financial crises—including banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises—took place in 15, 62, 67, and 38 countries 
during the 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009 global recessions (including the two years before and after the recession years) 
(see Laeven and Valencia 2018). Most of the financial crises in the 1975 global recession were currency crises in EMDEs, 
while Chile and Spain experienced systemic banking crises in 1976 and in 1977, respectively. 
11 
Japan—Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States—experienced 
persistent and high inflation, and the 1975 global recession was the beginning of a half-
decade of stagflation, with low output growth and high inflation (Knoop 2004).22 
 
The global recession of 1982 was triggered by several developments, including the second 
oil shock of 1979; a tightening of monetary policies in the United States and other 
advanced economies; and the Latin American debt crisis (Kose et al. 2020). Oil prices rose 
sharply in 1979, partly owing to disruptions caused by the Iranian revolution, and this 
helped push inflation to new highs in several advanced economies. Partly in response, 
monetary policies were tightened significantly in several major advanced economies, 
including Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, causing 
sharp declines in activity and significant increases in unemployment rates in many cases 
in 1982-83. The increase in global interest rates and a collapse in commodity prices that 
stemmed from the weakening of global growth made it difficult for many Latin American 
countries to service their debts, resulting in debt crises in the region. The advanced 
economies were generally able to begin their recoveries relatively quickly, although 
unemployment in some cases remained relatively high. But the debt crisis contributed to 
long-lasting growth slowdowns in many EMDEs, especially in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
The 1991 global recession also resulted from the confluence of a wide range of factors 
(Perry and Schultze 1993). The 1990-91 Gulf War was associated with heightened 
geopolitical uncertainty and another sharp increase in oil prices. In the United States, 
widespread weakness of lending institutions, evident since the mid-1980s, weighed on the 
housing market, especially during the credit crunch of 1990-91 (Bernanke and Lown 1991; 
Hall 1993). Scandinavian countries had severe banking crises in the early 1990s, following 
the liberalization of financial sectors and rapid expansion in credit markets in the 1980s. 
In Europe, problems with the European Monetary System’s exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) in 1992 were accompanied by sharp declines in activity in many member countries. 
In Japan, the bursting of an asset price bubble resulted in a recession and a prolonged 
period of low growth and near-zero inflation. In Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR, the transition to market economies was accompanied by high inflation and 
output contractions. 
 
The 2009 global recession followed the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
The crisis started in mid-2007 in major advanced economies, and followed a period of 
loosening regulation and supervision of financial markets and institutions, asset price and 
credit booms in a number of countries, and the rapid expansion of high-risk lending, 
particularly in U.S. mortgage markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers, in September 
2008, triggered a full-blown financial and macroeconomic crisis. Although the initial 
trigger for the crisis was the U.S. mortgage markets, the high degree of interconnectedness 
between the U.S. and other financial markets caused the crisis to spread to other advanced 
economies and some EMDEs. Banking crises erupted in many European countries in 2008, 
                                                 
22 By 1980, immediately after the second oil shock, inflation had risen to levels higher than those seen after the first oil 
shock in all G7 countries except Japan and the United Kingdom, while inflation in Germany remained relatively 
moderate. 
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causing financial crises in the euro area in 2011-13. These events caused sharp asset price 
declines and severe credit crunches, a collapse in global trade, and highly synchronized 
recessions in a record number of countries around the world. However, as discussed below, 
with the exception of some of those in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, EMDEs 
weathered the 2009 global recession relatively well. 
 
3.3. Synchronization of national recessions 
 
Global recessions are highly synchronized events internationally. The fraction of countries 
in recession increased during the four global recessions (Figure 7). The GDP-weighted 
fraction of countries in recession was about 50 percent in the first three global recessions, 
but rose to slightly more than 80 percent in the latest episode. The unweighted fraction 
of countries in recession reached local peaks during the global recession years. For 
example, it was about 60 percent during the 2009 episode.23 In all four global recessions, 
the fraction of countries in recession started picking up ahead of the recession year. 
 
The number of countries in recession was often relatively low two to three years prior to 
each global recession. The 2006-07 period stands out for the historically low number of 
countries in recession. However, this was followed by a sharp reversal of fortune. In 2009, 
almost all advanced economies (35 out of 36) and roughly half of EMDEs were in a 
recession. The degree of international synchronicity in the last global recession was the 
highest in the past 70 years, possibly reflecting the unusual depth of the global financial 
crisis and much stronger international trade and financial linkages than in earlier episodes. 
 
4. Main Features of Global Recessions, Recoveries and Expansions 
 
4.1. Global Recessions 
 
The behavior of the main macroeconomic and financial variables displays a number of 
regularities during the four global recessions. The 2009 global recession, which saw by far 
the largest declines in many indicators of activity, otherwise followed a pattern broadly 
similar to the previous episodes. The impact of global recessions often varied across 
different groups of countries and regions. 
 
Sharp contraction in real activity. In the four global recessions, per capita global output 
(market exchange rate weighted) declined on average by 1.3 percent, which is 3.5 
percentage points below the average annual growth rate of 2.2 percent during the 1950-
2019 non-recession years (Table 3). With PPP weights, the decline in per capita output 
during global recessions was, on average, 0.8 percent, while growth during expansion years 
was 2.5 percent. 
 
                                                 
23 Imbs (2010), using monthly industrial production data, concludes that the degree of cross-country business cycle 
correlation during the latest recession was the highest over the past three decades. Other research also indicates that 
shocks originating in credit markets have been influential in driving global activity during global recessions, including 
the 2009 episode (Helbling et al. 2011; Eickmeir and Ng 2015; Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2016; Perri and Quadrini 
2018). 
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Among the four global recessions, the 2009 episode was by far the deepest. It involved the 
only annual contraction in real global GDP since 1950.24 The least severe episode in terms 
of per capita output growth was the 1991 recession. The average annual growth of output 
over the four global recession episodes was 0.3 percent, about 3.6 percentage points lower 
than average world growth during expansion years (3.9 percent). 
 
World per capita output, industrial production, trade, and oil consumption often started 
to slow down two years before the global recessions (Figure 8.A). Moreover, investment, 
industrial production, and trade typically declined much more than output during the 
global recessions. While private consumption generally held up relatively well, its growth 
was much weaker than in non-recession years. Oil consumption declined in every global 
recession except for the 1991 episode.25 
 
Depressed financial markets and business confidence. Asset prices and credit on average 
began decelerating about two years ahead of each global recession (Figure 8.B). The 
average annual rate of credit growth during the global recessions was about two-fifths of 
the annual average observed in non-recession years, while both house and equity prices 
fell, with the decline in the former on average three times larger than the latter. Financial 
conditions often tightened before the global recessions but then quickly loosened as 
monetary policy became accommodative. Inflation typically fell during global recessions, 
which gave further license for central banks to reduce interest rates (Figure 8.C). 
 
The behavior of real interest rates varied widely across the episodes. For example, real 
rates declined in the 1991 and 2009 episodes, but went up during the 1975 and 1982 
recession. Business confidence fell in all global recession episodes. Economic policy 
uncertainty increased during the two episodes—1991 and 2009—for which data are 
available (Caldara et al. 2019; Baker and Bloom 2013). 
 
Differences across country groups. The impact of global recessions has varied across 
different groups of countries and regions (Table 4). In advanced economies, average per 
capita growth fell to -1.1 percent during the global recession years, from 2.7 percent during 
non-recession years. In EMDEs, the decline was to 0.2 percent from 3 percent (LICs on 
average suffered larger declines in per capita growth than other EMDEs). Thus, the drop 
in growth was 1 percentage point greater for the advanced economies than for the EMDEs. 
In addition, both trade and industrial production registered much larger contractions in 
advanced economies than EMDEs. 
 
Some EMDE regions have been able to weather global recessions better than others. For 
example, the EAP and SAR regions continued expanding during the past four global 
recessions whereas the other four regions all on average experienced declines in per capita 
                                                 
24 On the basis of the quarterly data, average annual per capita output growth in the four global recessions was -2.4 
percent (Table 1). The deepest recession is again seen to be that of 2009 and the least severe that of 1991: average 
annual growth rates in the four recessions were -1.9 percent (1974:1-1975:1), -0.9 percent (1981:4-1982:4), -0.5 percent 
(1990:4-1991:1), and -5.4 percent (2008:3-2009:1). Per capita growth was negative in each quarter of the four recessions, 
except in 1974:2 when growth picked up to 0.8 percent for one quarter only. 
25 Oil consumption declined in only nine years of the past seventy (i.e., 1974-75, 1980-83, 1993, and 2008-09). These 
episodes coincided with the global recessions or were within two years before or after them. 
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output (though aggregate output continued growing, on average, in LAC and SSA). One 
explanation for this outcome is that while EAP and SAR mostly comprise relatively fast-
growing commodity importers (including the large economies of China in EAP and India 
in SAR), the other four regions consist more of commodity exporters that have been 
severely affected by the collapses in demand for commodities associated with global 
recessions. 
 
The 2009 recession. The unusually sharp declines in a wide range of economic indicators, 
especially growth in both aggregate and per capita global output, highlight the severity 
of the 2009 global recession. The global impact was amplified by the growing importance 
of international linkages through trade and financial flows. While the globalization of 
national manufacturing chains was a major force driving the growth of world trade in the 
two decades prior to the global recession, it appears to have been instrumental in driving 
the sharp contraction of cross-border trade during 2009.26 The 2009 episode also saw the 
largest increase in the index of global policy uncertainty, and the second sharpest decline 
in business confidence (the largest decline took place during the 1975 global recession). 
 
Global capital flows registered their sharpest fall during the 2009 global recession. After 
overshadowing the growth of global trade flows over the previous two decades, global 
capital flows had reached unprecedented levels in 2007. But they rapidly dried up in the 
last quarter of 2008, as the global financial crisis spread from advanced economies to 
EMDEs. Variations among countries in the decline of capital flows appear to have been 
related to the degrees of trade and financial openness, the nature of financial linkages 
(e.g., reliance on bank flows), and domestic macroeconomic conditions.27 
 
As the epicenter of the financial crisis, advanced economies felt its brunt the most (Figure 
8.D; Table 4). Almost all of them experienced much larger declines in output than in the 
previous global recessions, and on average their per capita output growth declined to -4 
percent in 2009, more than 6 percentage points below their average growth rate during 
non-recession years. Contractions in trade, industrial production, and employment were 
also much sharper in these economies than in EMDEs. 
 
In contrast, EMDE output growth remained positive, although it did slow sharply, from 
8.2 percent in 2007 to 5.7 percent in 2008 and 1.8 percent in 2009. EMDEs delivered their 
strongest recovery following the 2009 episode, as discussed below (Kose, Otrok, and 
Prasad 2012). LICs were also able to continue growing during the 2009 global recession 
whereas their growth fell to negative rates in per capita terms in the previous episodes. 
 
                                                 
26 The contraction in international trade also appears to have been driven partly by other factors, including a sharp fall 
in trade credit, the increased role of durable consumer goods (with relatively high income elasticity of demand) in trade, 
accumulated inventories by importing firms, and the strong cross-border spillovers associated with demand shocks. The 
collapse of trade (relative to output) during the 2009 global recession is much larger than that predicted by standard 
business cycle models. For potential explanations, see Eaton et al. 2016; Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010); 
Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010); Chor and Manova (2012); Freund (2009); and Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010). 
27 For discussions of movements in capital flows, see Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), Claessens (2017), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2018), Koepke (2019), and Kose and Ohnsorge (2019). 
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In the 2009 episode, there were some stark differences across EMDE regions (Figure 8.D; 
Table 5). ECA took the largest hit partly because the withdrawal of Western European 
banks caused a severe credit crunch, and the region’s per capita output declined by more 
than 5 percent in 2009. Per capita output in LAC and the Middle East and North Africa 
(MNA) also contracted as commodity prices and exports collapsed. In EAP and SAR, 
expansions continued, partly reflecting heavy use of monetary and fiscal stimulus in the 
largest economies to support activity (World Bank 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Unlike the 
previous global recessions, when SSA experienced declines in per capita output, the region 
was able to avoid recession in 2009 partly because it had limited exposure to global 
financial markets but stronger linkages, especially through trade, with the large emerging 
market economies of EAP, which continued growing (Fosu 2013). 
 
4.2. Global Recoveries 
 
A global recovery typically involves broad-based rebounds in multiple measures of 
economic activity and financial markets. The strength of recoveries differs across countries 
and country groups. For instance, there is evidence that recoveries from the four global 
recessions tend to be weaker in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes than in 
countries with more flexible regimes (Terrones 2019). Following the 2009 global recession, 
advanced economies experienced the weakest recovery among the four episodes while 
EMDEs enjoyed their strongest. 
 
Broad rebound in activity. Most indicators of global activity started expanding in the 
first year of each recovery (Figure 9.A). The average growth rate of global output in the 
first year (or the first three years) of recoveries was close to the average growth rate in a 
typical year of the full sample period (Table 6). The growth rates of consumption, 
investment, and international trade picked up in the first year of each recovery while oil 
consumption tended to increase. The global recovery from the 1975 recession was the 
strongest in terms of average output growth in the first three years of the recovery, as 
well as in terms of growth in the first year. The recovery after the 1991 global recession 
was the weakest. 
 
Recoveries in financial markets. Global financial markets have tended to rally as recoveries 
have strengthened over time (Figure 9.B). In the recoveries from both the 1991 and 2009 
recessions, for which these estimates are available, broad financial conditions loosened 
further in the first year of the recovery but then gradually tightened. Although global 
equity prices on average have picked up quickly, in the first year of recoveries, house 
prices have tended to remain depressed for two to three years. Credit growth has also 
generally taken longer to attain the rates observed during non-recession periods. Housing 
markets were depressed mostly during the recoveries following the three most recent global 
recessions. Equity markets remained weak during the recovery from the 1975 recession, 
partly reflecting the stagflation in several major advanced economies. 
 
The 2009 episode, which saw the lowest rate of inflation during a recession, was followed 
in 2010 by a further dip of inflation to near zero. It thereafter rose quite modestly, to 
stabilize at a rate in the low single digits. Because of the depressed inflation post-2009, 
accommodative monetary policies kept nominal interest rates low, and real interest rates 
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remained somewhat below zero (Figure 9.C). Nominal rates declined during and after 
previous recessions too, but there was a less consistent pattern to real rates. For example, 
although real interest rates remained negative after the 1975 and 2009 episodes, they went 
up following the recession of 1982. Business confidence quickly recovered to the pre-
recession levels except after the 1991 recession because of the financial turbulence in 
Europe. 
 
Differences across country groups. The four global recoveries featured many 
commonalities, but they also displayed important differences across country groups and 
EMDE regions (Figure 9.D; Table 7). First, advanced economies on average delivered 
better per capita GDP growth outcomes (in the first three years) during the first three 
recoveries than did EMDEs. They also experienced faster trade growth during these 
episodes. Second, per capita GDP growth in LICs was much weaker than in the broader 
group of EMDEs, as well as the advanced economies, during the global recoveries. Third, 
while EAP and SAR experienced robust recoveries, other regions suffered significant 
contractions during some recovery episodes mostly because of region-specific factors 
(Table 8). For example, LAC and SSA saw slumps in per capita output during the 1983-
85 recovery because of the debt crises engulfing these regions, and ECA experienced a 
serious recession during the 1992-94 global recovery driven by challenges of transition. 
 
Recovery following the 2009 recession. The trajectory of per capita global output in the 
most recent recovery was slightly weaker than that of the period following the 1975 global 
recession (Figure 9.A). After the latest recession, there were stronger rebounds in 
industrial production and trade in the first three years than in the previous three 
recoveries. The pattern of global unemployment during the latest global recovery follows 
that of the previous episodes but the average rate of unemployment remained elevated in 
2010-12. 
 
Financial markets experienced a subdued recovery after 2009 (Figures 9.B and 9.C). 
Credit registered its weakest growth among the four episodes while both housing and 
equity markets struggled in the first three years. The latest recovery was characterized 
by the lowest inflation and nominal interest rates. Capital flows, however, picked up quite 
strongly in the first year of the recovery, and then stabilized at a lower level than the 
average over the 2003-07 period. 
 
The global recovery from the 2009 recession was significantly different from the previous 
three episodes, particularly in its uneven nature—especially in the differences in 
performance between advanced economies and EMDEs (Figure 9.D; Table 7). Advanced 
economies were the engines of previous global recoveries, but EMDEs accounted for the 
lion’s share of global growth after the 2009 global recession: the average contribution of 
advanced economies to global growth during the previous three global recoveries (i.e., 
over 1976-78, 1983-85, and 1992-94) was 75 percent, but it dropped to 35 percent in 2010-
12. 
 
For the advanced economies, the most recent recovery, in 2010-12, was the weakest in 
terms of both output and output per capita. This reflects in part the legacies of the global 
financial crisis, particularly the deterioration in credit and housing markets, as well as 
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labor markets. The balance sheets of households and financial sectors were severely 
damaged, resulting in a sharp contraction of investment, especially construction. Some 
countries in the euro area also struggled to finance their public debt and experienced 
severe sovereign debt crises in 2011-13, including Cyprus and Greece. Compared to the 
previous episodes, growth rates of consumption and investment were much weaker in 
advanced economies. Reflecting anemic income growth in these economies, unemployment 
declined only slowly during the recovery, especially in the euro area. 
 
In contrast, EMDEs, as a group, enjoyed their strongest recovery following the 2009 global 
recession. Despite an unfavorable external environment, both industrial production and 
trade rebounded strongly, supported by a sharp increase in credit growth (Table 7). 
EMDEs weathered the global recession relatively well thanks to the large, prompt, and 
globally coordinated policy support, as discussed below. The strong performance of 
EMDEs during the early years of the recovery also reflects previous structural 
improvements such as better-regulated financial systems and stronger macroeconomic 
policy frameworks that allowed them to pursue more credible and effective countercyclical 
policies (Kose and Prasad 2010). 
 
While it was a relatively robust recovery for EMDEs generally, its strength differed among 
the regions, with growth stronger in EAP, SAR, and LAC than in ECA and MNA. For 
example, the ECA region suffered a financial shock qualitatively similar to that in many 
advanced economies, its growth was slower than the other regions in the first year of the 
recovery.28 Among the four global recoveries examined, the most recent was the first in 
which LICs were able to deliver positive per capita GDP growth, partly because of a sharp 
increase in their exports. 
 
Policy responses during recessions and recoveries. In response to the prospect of large 
output and employment losses in the wake of the financial turbulence of 2008, a number 
of advanced economies and EMDEs employed wide-ranging expansionary fiscal policy 
measures during 2008–09 (Kose and Ohnsorge 2019). These coordinated measures were 
instrumental in supporting global demand at the height of the global financial crisis and 
in limiting the decline in activity. However, as public debt and financing requirements 
rose significantly, market pressures and—perhaps more important—political constraints 
led advanced economies to withdraw fiscal support in 2010.29 
 
The change in fiscal policy stance led to an unprecedented outcome, with quite different 
paths for government expenditures in advanced economies from past recoveries, when 
policy was expansionary for longer, with continued increases in real primary government 
                                                 
28 The incidence of sudden stops in capital inflows tipping countries into financial distress was about half of that prior 
to 2008, and centered in economies where pre-crisis credit booms were funded by large capital inflows and where banks 
had narrow deposit bases, such as some economies in ECA (Feyen et al. 2014). Data taken from Forbes and Warnock 
(2012) indicate that more than 80 percent of countries in the sample experienced sudden stops in 2009, while the share 
was around 46 percent, on average, in 1982 and 1991. In addition, many sudden stops episodes were observed during 
the global downturns of 1998 and 2001. Eichengreen and Gupta (2016) also document the high incidence of sudden 
stops during the 2009 global recession. 
29 In advanced economies, government expenditures started increasing gradually since 2015 as public investment picked 
up in major economies. A number of countries have implemented tax reforms to stimulate activity over the past decade 
(IMF 2019; OECD 2019). 
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expenditures (Figure 10). In contrast, in EMDEs, the recovery was accompanied by 
expansionary fiscal policy (Kose et. al 2017). EMDE governments employed fiscal 
packages that included infrastructure investment, tax cuts, and social protection 
programs. 
 
Monetary policies in advanced economies remained exceptionally accommodative during 
the latest recovery—more so than in earlier episodes (Arteta et al. 2015; Ha, Kose, and 
Ohnsorge 2019). Monetary policy played a key role in restoring financial sector health, 
limiting the economic downturn, and supporting the recovery. During the early stages of 
the global financial crisis, central banks in the major advanced economies sharply reduced 
interest rates, expanded their liquidity facilities, and started large-scale purchases of 
longer-term assets. The combination of near-zero policy interest rates and the record 
expansion of central bank balance sheets was unprecedented. Policy rates remained at, or 
close to, the zero lower bound, and below zero in some cases, and central bank balance 
sheets were expanded further. In addition, central banks began or intensified the use of 
forward guidance about the direction of monetary policy to help manage expectations and 
lower longer-term interest rates. EMDE central banks too lowered policy interest rates, 
which was made easier by their success in taming inflation before the crisis, and some 
EMDEs intervened in foreign exchange markets to support their currencies, having 
accumulated ample foreign reserves before the crisis. 
 
4.3. Global Expansions 
 
The global expansion phase refers to the period between two global recessions. The world 
economy has experienced four expansions since the 1975 recession: 1976–81, 1983–90, 
1992–2008, and the current expansion, which started in 2010. 
 
Different durations. Global expansions since 1975 have varied in duration, between 6 years 
(following the 1975 recession) and 17 years (following the 1991 recession). The longest 
global expansion, 1992–2008, coincided with the information technology revolution, the 
integration of China and many other emerging market economies into the global economy, 
a sharp increase in commodity prices, and rapid growth in international trade and 
financial flows. Although this benign period of macroeconomic stability acquired the label 
of “The Great Moderation”, it did witness global downturns in 1998 and 2001, during 
which the world economy came close to outright recession. The latest global expansion, 
which turned ten years old in 2019, has seen a global downturn episode in 2012, but also 
the longest U.S. expansion in history. 
 
Changes in amplitude over time. The world economy on average registered 3.3 percent 
annual output growth in the four global expansions (Figure 11.A; Table 9). The strongest 
expansion was the one that followed the 1982 recession. Reflecting the support of 
accommodative policies, recoveries in confidence, pent up demand, and ample spare 
capacity, the growth of activity in the first year after each global recession has tended to 
be faster than average growth over the expansion phase. 
 
The post-2009 global expansion. The current global expansion has registered average 
annual per capita GDP growth similar to those of previous episodes. However, it is 
19 
distinguished by the lowest average growth in industrial production of all four expansions 
(when their initial years are excluded). The current expansion has also seen the weakest 
growth in global trade. Since 2011, average annual global trade growth has been 3.9 
percent, well below the 5.2 percent average of previous global expansions. This weakening 
of trade growth has reflected a combination of factors, including weak demand growth in 
advanced economies, shifts in the composition of global demand, the maturation of global 
supply chains, and increased trade tensions between major economies, particularly 
involving the United States. 
 
The current expansion has also seen the lowest growth in capital flows. Sluggish 
investment growth has been reflected in a decline in global capital flows since 2011 (Table 
9). Capital flows to EMDEs have been sluggish, with repeated spikes in borrowing costs 
since mid-2013. Following an initial rebound after the recession, global capital flows have 
declined. 
 
Weak expansion in advanced economies. The expansions following the 1991 and 2009 
global recessions were the weakest of the four episodes in advanced economies. Despite 
the marked difference in the severity of these two recessions, their underlying causes and 
the evolution of activity during the following expansions share remarkable similarities for 
advanced economies (Figure 11.B; Table 10). Both recessions were associated with 
disruptions in credit and housing markets in the major advanced economies. In particular, 
the global expansion following the 1991 recession was adversely affected by the ripple 
effects of collapses in credit and asset markets in the United States and Japan. Similarly, 
the deep 2009 global recession was associated with substantial problems in credit and 
housing markets in the United States and a number of other advanced economies, 
including France, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic 
countries. 
 
The expansions following the 1991 and 2009 global recessions were also both slowed by 
particular challenges in Europe. Both the latest expansion and the one following the 1991 
global recession were hampered by problems in the European Monetary System—the 
ERM crisis in 1992 and crises in the euro area in 2011-13. There were downturns in many 
European countries in the wake of the ERM crisis, which involved significant increases in 
interest rates in several countries and which took a severe toll on confidence. The euro 
area debt crisis in 2012-13 also weakened growth in several of its members. Growth in the 
euro area has remained generally sluggish throughout the expansion, with the highest 
annual output growth of 2.4 percent in 2017, leaving unemployment still high in a number 
of countries. 
 
Reversal of fortunes for EMDEs. The latest global expansion was the strongest one for 
EMDEs in terms of per capita output growth. However, after enjoying the strongest 
recovery immediately following the 2009 global recession, EMDEs have since experienced 
a protracted slowdown following the drop in commodity prices in 2012 (Figure 11.B; 
Tables 10 and 11). EMDE GDP growth slowed from 7.4 percent in 2010 to a trough of 
3.8 percent in 2015 (Didier et. al. 2015). The growth slowdown during 2011-15 was 
synchronous (affecting more than three-fifths of EMDEs) and protracted, with the 
steepest slowdowns in LAC and the mildest in SAR. In LICs, GDP growth slowed from 
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6.2 percent in 2012 to a trough of 5 percent in 2016. In 2017, many EMDEs saw a mild 
cyclical recovery, led by growth in exports and investment as global manufacturing and 
trade picked up, but EMDE growth has since weakened again. 
 
Weakening global economic growth has coincided with country-specific challenges in some 
large EMDEs. In China, for example, with the unwinding of policy stimulus, efforts have 
also been also made to guide the economy away from investment- and export-driven 
growth toward more balanced growth that relies more on consumer spending. The 
resultant slowdown in China, from growth of 8.9 percent on average during the previous 
global expansions to 6.6 percent in 2018, has weighed on growth in its trading partners 
and in commodity exporters (World Bank 2016; Huidrom et al. 2019). In some other 
major EMDEs, episodes of policy uncertainty, social tensions, geopolitical events, and civil 
wars have caused sharp losses in confidence. 
 
Repeated short-term growth disappointments. The latest global recovery has also seen 
repeated downgrades in short-term global growth forecasts (Figure 12). Over 2010-19, on 
average, current- year growth projections in consensus forecasts have been downgraded 
from a year earlier in around 52 percent of countries. Downgrades affected growth 
forecasts for both advanced economies (49 percent of countries) and EMDEs (54 percent 
of countries), but with forecasts for EMDEs revised down by a wider margin. For EMDEs, 
since 2009, growth has been revised down by an average of 0.2 percentage points for the 
current year forecast, relative to the one made a year earlier. 
 
Diminishing long-term growth projections. The 2009 global recession marked a turning 
point in long-term (ten-years ahead) global growth projections (Kose, Ohnsorge, and 
Sugawara 2020). Long-term forecasts for global GDP growth increased from 3 percent in 
1998 to 3.3 percent in 2008. Since then, they have steadily declined, to 2.5 percent in 
2019. Growth forecasts for advanced economies began to be downgraded after the 1991 
global recession. After a brief period of upgrades in the late 1990s, they resumed their 
gradual decline in the early 2000s. In contrast, EMDEs enjoyed improving growth 
prospects up to the 2009 global recession. Since then, long-term forecasts have materially 
deteriorated for both groups of countries. 
 
Prior to the 2009 global recession, growth prospects were supported by a rapid expansion 
of investment, trade, and financial flows. However, during the most recent global 
expansion, cyclical factors, such as the anemic recovery in advanced economies, a sharp 
collapse in commodity prices, and weak investment growth, have been compounded by 
structural weaknesses, including slower productivity growth, and a slowdown in the 
growth of working-age populations. 
 
These structural factors have been eroding global potential growth—the growth rate that 
the global economy would sustain at full capacity utilization and full employment. In 
2013-17, global potential growth is estimated to have been roughly 1 percentage point a 
year lower than a decade earlier, as a result of weaker productivity growth, sluggish 
expansion of investment, and a broadening slowdown in working-age population growth. 
Annual potential growth estimates for advanced economies were reduced to 1.4 percent 
on average in 2013-17, from 2.2 percent a decade earlier. Potential output growth in 
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EMDEs is also estimated to have slowed, from 5.9 percent a year in the mid-2000s to 4.8 
percent a year in 2013-17, reflecting the effects of weak investment, adverse demographic 
trends, and slower productivity growth. 
 
In light of the protracted weakness of economic growth, together with chronically low 
inflation (persistently below target in most cases), despite unprecedented monetary policy 
accommodation maintained over several years and historically low long-term interest 
rates, some observers have argued that advanced economies have been facing “secular 
stagnation”, owing to structural weakness in aggregate demand (Teulings and Baldwin 
2014; Summers 2015; Rachel and Summers 2019).30 Many factors may have contributed 
to such demand weakness, including increased saving originating partly from demographic 
factors and reduced investment spending stemming partly from the reduced costs of 
capital goods, which have increasingly embodied information technology. Financial crises 
may also have contributed through higher risk aversion, increased costs of financial 
intermediation, and increased debt overhangs. Recent research concludes that, in light of 
the Japanese experience after its banking crisis in the early 1990s, some major euro area 
economies might suffer a long period of stagnation because of structural headwinds 
associated with demographic trends and persistent weakness in productivity growth 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2015). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The year 2019 was the tenth anniversary of the last global recession. Yet 2019 also marked 
an intensifying speculation about whether another such episode was looming. During 2019, 
global growth forecasts were repeatedly downgraded as a broad-based slowdown enveloped 
both advanced economies and EMDEs. Trade tensions between major economies led to 
unprecedented policy uncertainty and took a heavy toll on global industrial production 
and trade. 
 
In light of the resurgence of interest on the topic, this paper analyzes the main features 
of global recessions and the ensuing global recoveries and expansions.  
 
What happens during global recessions and recoveries? Both statistical and judgmental 
methods identify four global recessions since 1950: in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. During 
these four years, there was a contraction in annual real per capita global GDP and broad-
based weakness in the main indicators of global activity. Quarterly data yield similar 
recession dates, and confirm that the duration of a typical global recession is about one 
year—which is also the average duration of national recessions. Global recessions are 
highly synchronized events, with severe economic and financial disruptions occurring 
simultaneously in many countries around the world. Although the four global recessions 
                                                 
30 Hansen (1939) argues that the Great Depression could lead to a prolonged period of stagnation and high 
unemployment because of the decline in the birth rate and excessive savings that constrain aggregate demand. For a 
theoretical formulation of secular stagnation, see Eggertsson, Mehrotra, and Robbins (2019). Hamilton et al. (2016) 
argue that the secular stagnation hypothesis confuses a delayed recovery with chronically weak aggregate demand. By 
examining global real interest rates over eight centuries, Schmelzing (2020) concludes that the current decline in 
sovereign real rates is a path to converge to the historical trend, rather than a sign of secular stagnation. Others consider 
the case for secular stagnation to be weak (Rogoff 2013; Taylor 2014). 
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coincided with recessions in the United States, not every U.S. recession coincided with a 
global recession: in fact, the United States experienced six additional recessions during 
1950-2019. 
 
The world economy suffered a sizable contraction in per capita output during the four 
global recessions since 1950: the average decline in per capita output (market exchange 
rate weighted) was about 1.3 percent, 3.5 percentage points lower than the average annual 
growth rate (2.2 percent) in the non-recession years during 1950-2019. Financial 
conditions tended to tighten, business confidence declined, and policy uncertainty 
increased during the global recessions. The 2009 global recession was by far the deepest 
and most internationally synchronized among the four: it saw the only outright annual 
contraction in global output and the largest declines in global trade, capital flows, and 
industrial production. 
 
In addition to the four global recessions, the global economy experienced relatively slow 
growth in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 2012. During these episodes, which we refer to as “global 
downturns”, the global economy registered its lowest growth rates of the past seven 
decades, except for the years of and around the four global recessions. However, these 
episodes fall short of qualifying as recessions both because world real GDP per capita did 
not contract and several activity indicators remained robust. 
 
Global recoveries have generally been characterized by a broad-based rebound in economic 
activity and normalization of financial conditions. The average growth rate of global 
output in the first year (or over the first three years) of recoveries has been close to the 
longer-term average. Financial conditions often remained loose in the first year of the 
recovery but then gradually tightened. Among the four episodes, the recovery from the 
1975 recession saw the steepest acceleration in growth in its first year. Thanks to large, 
prompt, and globally coordinated policy support, the recovery following the 2009 recession 
was the second strongest episode. 
 
How do global recessions and recoveries vary across different groups of countries? First, 
per capita output growth declined more in advanced economies than in EMDEs during 
global recessions, with some EMDE regions consistently faring better than others. The 
EAP and SAR regions continued expanding in each of the past four global recessions 
whereas the other four regions all experienced declines in average per capita output. 
Second, LICs on average suffered larger declines in growth than the broader group of 
EMDEs. Third, in all four global recessions, both trade and industrial production 
registered much larger contractions in advanced economies than in EMDEs. 
 
The magnitude of the 2009 global recession varied across the country groups. As the 
epicenter of the financial crisis, advanced economies felt the initial brunt of the recession 
but also suffered the weakest recovery in terms of output and output per capita compared 
with previous episodes. In contrast, EMDE output growth remained positive during the 
2009 recession, and EMDEs’ subsequent recovery was the strongest of the four global 
recessions examined. LICs also were able to continue growing during the 2009 global 
recession, whereas their growth plummeted in the previous episodes. 
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What happens during global expansions and how does the current global expansion 
compare with previous ones? The duration of global expansions has varied from six years 
(following the 1975 recession) to 17 years (following the 1991 recession). The latest global 
expansion turned 10 years old in 2019. It includes a global downturn in 2012 but also the 
longest U.S. expansion in history. The latest expansion has registered average per capita 
growth comparable with previous episodes but it has also seen the weakest growth in 
global trade and capital flows. 
 
The current expansion has been the weakest in advanced economies as many of them have 
struggled to overcome the legacies of the global financial crisis and structural weaknesses 
in demand. In contrast, it has been the strongest one for EMDEs in terms of per capita 
output growth. However, EMDEs also experienced a slowdown in growth during the 
expansion as a result of both external and domestic factors. 
 
Monetary and fiscal policies often become expansionary leading into global recessions, and 
typically continue supporting the ensuing global recoveries. In advanced economies, 
monetary policies remained highly accommodative for almost the whole post-2009 decade, 
with central banks introducing a wide range of unconventional measures to ease credit 
conditions. However, after the implementation of large, coordinated, fiscal stimulus 
programs during 2008-09, fiscal support was withdrawn shortly into the recovery. By 
contrast, EMDEs have generally employed expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
during most of the expansion, apart from some adjustments of monetary policy in response 
to cyclical conditions and financial stability concerns. 
 
Short- and long-term global growth forecasts have both been repeatedly downgraded 
during the latest global expansion. During 2010-19, on average, current- year global 
growth forecasts have been downgraded from a year earlier in around 52 percent of 
countries. The long-term forecasts for global GDP growth have also steadily declined, 
from 3.3 percent in 2008 to 2.5 percent in 2019. These downgrades reflect not just 
persistently mediocre growth outturns in many countries but also protracted weakness in 
the fundamental drivers of growth, including productivity and investment. 
 
Although there has been significant progress in our understanding of the global business 
cycle and its phases since the 2009 global recession, there remain a number of research 
avenues to explore. First, there is clear need to better understand the sources of the 
subdued growth performance that has been the hallmark of the current global expansion. 
Second, future work needs to focus on the cross-border spillovers and their interactions 
with domestic real and financial cycles. Third, global spillovers from national macro-
financial linkages require further scrutiny in light of the strong connections among 
financial entities in different countries.  
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Figure 1. Frequency of “global recession” in web search and news 
 
A. Web search on “global recession” B. News articles with “global recession” 
    
Sources: Factiva, Google, World Bank. 
Note: Panel A shows monthly index numbers that represent search interest for the term “global recession” relative 
to the highest point (i.e., peak popularity for the term, equal to 100). The information is obtained via Google Trends 
on January 22, 2020, with the following features: worldwide coverage, all categories, and web search. Last observation 
is December 2019. Panel B shows total numbers of articles (in English) in Reuters News that carry the term “global 
recession” during each year. A total of 17,084 articles are found in Factiva over 1987-2019 and reported as annual 
data. Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1991 and 2009, and global downturns in 1998, 2001, and 2012. The 
information is as of January 22, 2020. 
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Figure 2. Contributions of country groups to world output and growth 
 
A. World output B. World output growth 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Kose and Terrones (2015); World Bank. 
Note: Each bar in Panel A shows the average distribution of world output among country groups in the decade 
indicated (computed using market exchange rates). Each bar in Panel B corresponds to the average of each country 
group’s contribution to growth in world GDP in the decade indicated. The 2010s period refers to 2010-19, which 
includes estimates for 2019. 
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Figure 3. World trade and financial integration 
 
A. Trade openness B. Financial openness 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); International Monetary Fund; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018); 
World Bank. 
Note: Trade openness is the ratio of world exports and imports to world GDP. Financial openness is the sum of 
foreign assets and liabilities in percent of GDP across all countries. Each bar corresponds to the average in the decade 
indicated. The 2010s period refers to 2010-19, with estimates for 2019 in trade openness. For financial openness, data 
for 2019 are based on the numbers for the first two quarters. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of world output and world output per capita 
 
A. World output B. World per capita output 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Kose and Terrones (2015); World Bank. 
Note: Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 
2001, and 2012. Data for 2019 and 2020 are estimates and forecasts, respectively. 
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Figure 5. Growth of world output 
 
A. World output growth B. World per capita output growth 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Kose and Terrones (2015); World Bank. 
Note: Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 
2001, and 2012. Data for 2019 and 2020 are estimates and forecasts, respectively. 
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Figure 6. Growth of world output, quarterly 
 
A. World output growth B. World per capita output growth 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; World Bank. 
Note: Shaded areas show global recessions, which are identified using per capita output data and the algorithm in 
Harding and Pagan (2002). Last observation is 2019:3. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 7. International synchronization of recessions 
 
A. Countries in recession, weighted B. Countries in recession, unweighted 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Kose and Terrones (2015); World Bank. 
Note: Panel A shows the proportion of countries (weighted by GDP using market exchange rates) in recession, 
defined as a contraction in per capita GDP. Panel B shows the unweighted proportion of countries in recession. 
Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 
2012. Data for 2019 and 2020 are estimates and forecasts, respectively. 
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Figure 8.A. Economic activity during global recessions 
 
A. Output B. Output per capita 
  
C. Industrial production D. Trade 
  
E. Unemployment rate F. Oil consumption 
  
Sources: British Petroleum; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; 
Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Output, output per capita, industrial production, trade, and oil 
consumption are index numbers equal to 100 one year before year “t” (i.e., t-1 = 100). Aggregates for output, output 
per capita, and industrial production are market-weighted. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 8.B. Financial markets during global recessions 
 
A. Capital flows B. Credit 
  
C. Equity prices D. House prices 
  
E. Financial conditions F. Inflation 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and 
Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Equity prices, house prices, financial conditions, and inflation are weighted 
by GDP in U.S. dollars. Credit, equity prices, and house prices are index numbers equal to 100 one year before year 
“t” (i.e., t-1 = 100). For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 8.C. Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty during global recessions 
 
A. Nominal interest rate B. Real interest rate 
  
C. Business confidence D. Policy uncertainty 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Davis (2016); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and 
Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Variables are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. 
Business confidence and policy uncertainty are index numbers equal to 100 one year before year “t” (i.e., t-1 = 100). 
For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 8.D. Economic activity during global recessions, by country group 
 
A. Output per capita, advanced economies B. Output per capita, EMDEs 
  
C. Trade, advanced economies D. Trade, EMDEs 
  
E. Credit, advanced economies F. Credit, EMDEs 
  
Sources: Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Variables are index numbers equal to 100 one year before year “t” (i.e., t-
1 = 100). Aggregates for output per capita are market-weighted. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 9.A. Economic activity during global recoveries 
 
A. Output B. Output per capita 
  
C. Industrial production D. Trade 
  
E. Unemployment rate F. Oil consumption 
  
Sources: British Petroleum; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; 
Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to the average 
of the four global recessions identified. Output, output per capita, industrial production, trade, and oil consumption 
are index numbers equal to 100 in recession years. Aggregates for output, output per capita, and industrial production 
are market-weighted. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 9.B. Financial markets during global recoveries 
 
A. Capital flows B. Credit 
  
C. Equity prices D. House prices 
  
E. Financial conditions F. Inflation 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and 
Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Equity prices, house prices, financial conditions, and inflation are weighted 
by GDP in U.S. dollars. Credit, equity prices, and house prices are index numbers equal to 100 in recession years. 
For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 9.C. Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty during global recoveries 
 
A. Nominal interest rate B. Real interest rate 
  
C. Business confidence D. Policy uncertainty 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Davis (2016); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and 
Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Variables are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Business confidence and 
policy uncertainty are index numbers equal to 100 in recession years. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 9.D. Economic activity during global recoveries, by country group 
 
A. Output per capita, advanced economies B. Output per capita, EMDEs 
  
C. Trade, advanced economies D. Trade, EMDEs 
  
E. Credit, advanced economies F. Credit, EMDEs 
  
Sources: Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
the four global recessions identified. Variables are index numbers equal to 100 in recession years. Aggregates for 
output per capita are market-weighted. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 10. Fiscal and monetary policies during global recessions and recoveries 
 
A. World, government expenditure B. World, policy interest rate 
  
C. Advanced economies, government 
expenditure 
D. Advanced economies, policy interest rate 
  
E. EMDEs, government expenditure F. EMDEs, policy interest rate 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones 
(2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of the respective global recessions (shaded in gray). Average refers to an average of 
four global recessions with available data. Government expenditure is an index number equal to 100 in recession 
years. Aggregates are market-weighted. For details, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 11.A. Global economic activity and financial market developments in global 
expansions 
 
A. Output per capita B. Trade 
  
C. Unemployment rate D. Credit  
  
E. Equity prices F. House prices 
  
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones 
(2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Each bar represents average growth during the periods of global expansions. The growth rates of per capita 
output, credit, equity prices, and house prices are market-weighted (by GDP in U.S. dollars). 
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Figure 11.B. Global expansions by country group 
 
A. Output per capita, advanced economies B. Output per capita, EMDEs 
  
C. Trade, advanced economies D. Trade, EMDEs 
  
E. Credit, advanced economies F. Credit, EMDEs 
  
Sources: Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Each bar represents average growth during the periods of global expansions. The growth rates of per capita 
output and credit are market-weighted (by GDP in U.S. dollars). 
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Figure 12. Global growth forecasts 
 
A. Current-year growth forecast revisions B. Long-term growth forecasts 
  
Sources: Consensus Economics, World Bank. 
Note: Panel A shows differences in growth forecasts for current years as of December of the year and those made a 
year ago, in percentage points. The sample includes 85 countries, consisting of 33 advanced economies and 52 EMDEs, 
weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. In Panel B, the horizontal axis refers to the year of consensus forecast surveys. 
Annual averages of results from multiple surveys conducted in each year are presented. For example, forecasts for 
2019 are based on surveys that were conducted in January, April, July, and October. The sample includes 38 
countries, consisting of 20 advanced economies and 18 EMDEs, weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. 
 
  
-1
0
1
2
2010 2013 2016 2019
World
Advanced economies
EMDEs
Percentage points
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
World
Advanced economies
EMDEs (RHS)
Percent Percent
49 
 
Table 1. Main features of global recessions and expansions (with quarterly series) 
 
Note: The table shows the periods identified as global recessions and expansions, using the 
algorithm in Harding and Pagan (2002), or those with negative per capita growth. Amplitude 
and average are based on per capita global GDP growth. “Amplitude” is measured as a 
percent change in per capita output during each recession (i.e., a cumulative change over the 
denoted period). “Average” refers to average annualized growth during each period. 
 
 
  
Duration (quarters) Amplitude (percent) Average (percent)
Recessions
1974:1-1975:1 5 -9.3 -1.9
1981:4-1982:4 5 -4.5 -0.9
1990:4-1991:1 2 -0.9 -0.5
2008:3-2009:1 3 -15.3 -5.4
Average 4 -7.5 -2.2
Quarters with negative growth
1970:4 1 -0.7 -0.7
1980:2 1 -4.8 -4.8
1981:2 1 -0.3 -0.3
1998:1 1 -0.2 -0.2
2001:3 1 -0.5 -0.5
Expansions
1975:2-1981:3 26 2.5
1983:1-1990:3 31 2.8
1991:2-2008:2 69 2.2
2009:2-2019:3 42 2.1
Average 42 2.4
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Table 2. Output growth during global downturns 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes. “Global recessions” refers to average growth rates during the four global 
recessions (1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009). “Non-recessions” refers to averages during 1950-2019, which are shown as 
“All years,” excluding years of global recessions. 
 
  
1958 1998 2001 2012 Average
World
Output 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 0.3 3.9 3.7
Output per capita 0.2 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.8 -1.3 2.2 2.0
Output (PPP) 2.7 2.4 2.3 3.2 2.7 0.8 4.2 4.0
Output per capita (PPP) 0.7 1.0 1.1 2.0 1.2 -0.8 2.5 2.3
Advanced economies
Output 1.6 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.8 -0.4 3.5 3.3
Output per capita 0.4 2.1 0.9 0.6 1.0 -1.1 2.7 2.4
Output (PPP) 1.5 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.7 -0.4 3.5 3.3
Output per capita (PPP) 0.3 2.1 0.9 0.6 1.0 -1.1 2.7 2.5
EMDEs
Output 6.2 1.8 3.2 4.9 4.0 2.1 4.9 4.7
Output per capita 3.8 0.3 1.8 3.5 2.4 0.2 3.0 2.8
Output (PPP) 6.4 1.9 3.4 4.9 4.2 2.4 4.9 4.8
Output per capita (PPP) 4.0 0.4 2.0 3.6 2.5 0.5 3.0 2.9
Global downturns Global 
recessions
Non-
recessions
All 
years
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Table 3. Main features of global recessions 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in capital flows, unemployment rates, inflation, nominal 
and real interest rates, and policy rate, in which percentage-point changes of these variables are reported. 
“Non-recessions” refers to averages during 1950-2019, which are shown as “All years,” excluding years of 
global recessions. “Global downturns” shows averages during the four global downturns (1958, 1998, 2001, 
and 2012). “…” indicates that data are either unavailable or aggregates are not computed due to small sample 
size. For details, see Appendix 2. 
 
 
  
1975 1982 1991 2009 Average
Activity
Output 1.1 0.4 1.3 -1.8 0.3 3.9 2.3 3.7
Output per capita -0.7 -1.3 -0.3 -2.9 -1.3 2.2 0.8 2.0
Industrial production -7.4 -2.2 -0.1 -8.9 -4.6 4.0 0.3 3.5
Trade -1.4 -1.8 3.2 -10.4 -2.6 6.3 2.2 5.8
Unemployment rate 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.1
Oil consumption -0.8 -2.7 0.2 -1.0 -1.1 2.5 0.9 2.3
Investment 0.7 -1.1 -1.0 -5.0 -1.6 4.7 2.0 4.4
Consumption 2.6 1.6 1.9 -0.1 1.5 3.7 2.7 3.6
Output (PPP) 1.8 0.6 1.5 -0.5 0.8 4.2 2.7 4.0
Output per capita (PPP) -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -1.7 -0.8 2.5 1.2 2.3
Financial markets
Capital flows -1.6 -2.3 -3.2 -4.5 -2.9 0.5 -3.8 0.2
Credit 0.2 3.2 2.2 3.4 2.2 5.4 3.8 5.2
Equity prices -4.8 -10.9 -1.7 -13.5 -7.7 6.2 -2.9 5.3
House prices -4.3 -3.1 -0.2 -2.5 -2.5 2.2 1.5 1.8
Financial conditions … -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
Inflation -2.8 -2.5 0.2 -3.6 -2.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0
Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty
Nominal interest rate -2.5 -1.6 -1.0 -1.9 -1.8 0.1 -0.4 0.0
Real interest rate 0.9 1.1 -0.4 0.7 0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Business confidence -1.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 0.1 -0.7 0.0
Policy uncertainty … … 4.2 14.0 9.1 3.4 31.3 3.8
Policies
Government expenditure 9.2 2.3 3.4 8.7 5.9 4.7 4.8 4.8
Policy rate -2.3 -1.0 -1.2 -1.9 -1.6 0.1 -0.6 0.0
Global recessions Non-
recessions
All 
years
Global 
downturns
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Table 4. Main features of global recessions (by country group) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in unemployment rates and policy rate, in which percentage-
point changes of these variables are reported. See footnote of Table 3. 
 
 
  
1975 1982 1991 2009 Average
Advanced economies
Output 0.2 0.3 1.3 -3.4 -0.4 3.5 1.8 3.3
Output per capita -0.7 -0.3 0.6 -4.0 -1.1 2.7 1.0 2.4
Industrial production -7.8 -2.5 -0.2 -12.4 -5.7 3.6 -0.3 3.0
Trade -4.7 -0.1 3.7 -11.1 -3.1 6.4 1.7 5.9
Unemployment rate 1.5 1.3 0.6 2.2 1.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Output (PPP) 0.2 0.3 1.3 -3.3 -0.4 3.5 1.7 3.3
Output per capita (PPP) -0.7 -0.4 0.6 -3.9 -1.1 2.7 1.0 2.5
Credit 0.2 3.1 2.0 0.9 1.6 4.9 3.0 4.7
Government expenditure 8.6 3.5 3.6 7.3 5.7 4.2 3.5 4.2
Policy rate -2.4 -1.2 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7 0.1 -0.7 0.0
EMDEs
Output 4.2 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.1 4.9 4.0 4.7
Output per capita 2.0 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 0.2 3.0 2.4 2.8
Industrial production … … 0.4 -0.2 0.1 5.4 3.1 5.0
Trade 5.3 -5.1 2.0 -9.0 -1.7 6.1 3.8 5.6
Unemployment rate … -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
Output (PPP) 4.2 1.1 1.9 2.3 2.4 4.9 4.2 4.8
Output per capita (PPP) 2.1 -0.9 0.0 0.9 0.5 3.0 2.5 2.9
Credit -0.7 4.5 5.7 17.7 6.8 7.9 9.8 7.8
Government expenditure 16.0 -6.2 2.7 11.7 6.0 5.8 6.5 5.8
Policy rate 0.1 1.5 0.2 -2.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
LICs
Output 0.1 1.0 -0.5 5.9 1.6 3.9 3.6 3.8
Output per capita -2.3 -1.6 -3.3 3.0 -1.1 1.3 0.9 1.1
Trade 3.6 -5.6 -1.4 4.6 0.3 6.4 7.5 6.0
Output (PPP) 0.5 0.9 -0.2 5.0 1.6 4.0 3.6 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) -1.9 -1.7 -3.1 2.1 -1.2 1.4 1.0 1.2
Global recessions Global 
downturns
Non-
recessions
All 
years
53 
 
Table 5. Main features of global recessions (by region) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes. See footnote of Table 3. Regional aggregates include 
EMDEs only. 
  
1975 1982 1991 2009 Average
East Asia and Pacific
Output 6.6 6.3 8.3 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.7 7.0
Output per capita 4.4 4.6 6.7 6.7 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.4
Industrial production … … 11.1 8.0 9.5 9.9 6.3 9.9
Trade 0.2 -2.1 16.6 -6.4 2.1 9.0 4.0 8.6
Output (PPP) 6.4 6.0 8.2 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.2 6.9
Output per capita (PPP) 4.3 4.3 6.6 6.5 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.3
Europe and Central Asia
Output 6.2 3.0 -5.8 -5.1 -0.4 3.5 1.5 3.2
Output per capita 5.3 2.1 -6.2 -5.4 -1.0 2.9 1.3 2.6
Industrial production … … … -8.7 -8.7 3.8 1.3 3.3
Trade 8.5 -1.5 -17.1 -14.3 -6.1 5.8 3.0 5.0
Output (PPP) 6.2 3.1 -5.9 -5.4 -0.5 3.4 1.4 3.2
Output per capita (PPP) 5.2 2.2 -6.3 -5.6 -1.1 2.8 1.3 2.6
Latin America and the Caribbean
Output 3.8 -0.6 3.3 -1.8 1.2 4.1 2.6 3.9
Output per capita 1.4 -2.8 1.4 -2.9 -0.7 2.0 0.8 1.8
Industrial production … … 0.3 -6.5 -3.1 2.1 0.4 1.7
Trade -1.7 -10.4 11.2 -10.9 -3.0 6.0 2.5 5.5
Output (PPP) 3.7 -0.8 3.6 -2.0 1.2 4.0 2.6 3.8
Output per capita (PPP) 1.3 -2.9 1.7 -3.1 -0.8 1.9 0.8 1.8
Middle East and North Africa
Output -1.3 -6.4 6.9 0.5 -0.1 5.3 5.0 5.0
Output per capita -4.0 -9.5 4.4 -1.6 -2.7 2.7 2.8 2.4
Industrial production … … … … … … … …
Trade 5.0 -7.3 13.4 -7.0 1.0 5.4 7.5 5.1
Output (PPP) -0.5 -5.1 7.2 0.4 0.5 5.2 4.7 4.9
Output per capita (PPP) -3.2 -8.2 4.7 -1.7 -2.1 2.7 2.6 2.4
South Asia
Output 7.5 3.8 2.3 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.0
Output per capita 5.0 1.3 0.1 3.3 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.0
Industrial production … … … … … … … …
Trade 6.7 5.3 7.4 -6.5 3.2 6.9 4.8 6.6
Output (PPP) 7.6 3.9 2.3 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.0
Output per capita (PPP) 5.1 1.4 0.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Output 0.3 0.3 0.2 3.2 1.0 4.0 3.7 3.8
Output per capita -2.3 -2.6 -2.6 0.4 -1.8 1.2 1.0 1.1
Industrial production … … … … … … … …
Trade 6.4 -10.3 4.5 -9.9 -2.3 4.7 2.7 4.3
Output (PPP) 0.3 0.4 0.3 3.6 1.1 4.0 3.8 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 0.8 -1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1
Global recessions Global 
downturns
Non-
recessions
All 
years
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Table 6. Main features of global recoveries 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in capital flows, unemployment rates, inflation, nominal and real 
interest rates, and policy rate, in which percentage-point changes of these variables are reported. “All years” refers 
to averages during 1950-2019. “…” indicates that data are either unavailable or aggregates are not computed due to 
small sample size. For details, see Appendix 2. 
 
 
  
1976 1983 1992 2010 Average 1976-78 1983-85 1992-94 2010-12 Average
Activity
Output 5.2 2.7 1.7 4.4 3.5 4.4 3.6 2.1 3.4 3.4 3.7
Output per capita 3.4 0.9 0.2 3.1 1.9 2.6 1.7 0.6 2.1 1.8 2.0
Industrial production 7.9 1.7 -0.1 8.6 4.5 5.5 3.9 1.6 4.8 3.9 3.5
Trade 8.5 1.5 3.8 12.4 6.6 6.4 4.4 5.4 7.6 6.0 5.8
Unemployment rate 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Oil consumption 6.2 -0.2 1.6 3.4 2.8 5.0 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.3
Investment 5.6 1.8 -1.8 5.3 2.7 5.0 2.8 0.3 5.1 3.3 4.4
Consumption 4.7 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.4 4.3 3.5 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.6
Output (PPP) 5.6 2.8 1.8 5.3 3.9 4.6 3.5 2.3 4.2 3.7 4.0
Output per capita (PPP) 3.8 1.0 0.3 4.1 2.3 2.8 1.7 0.8 3.0 2.1 2.3
Financial markets
Capital flows 0.5 -1.5 2.0 8.0 2.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.2
Credit 3.7 4.3 2.4 1.1 2.9 4.4 5.7 2.5 1.8 3.6 5.2
Equity prices 2.6 23.2 10.4 17.4 13.4 -3.9 16.2 12.5 4.1 7.2 5.3
House prices -0.4 -0.1 -1.7 1.3 -0.2 1.8 -0.1 -1.1 -0.2 0.1 1.8
Financial conditions … 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.2 … 0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1
Inflation -2.8 -2.3 -1.5 1.5 -1.3 -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.0
Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty
Nominal interest rate 0.3 -1.8 -1.0 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Real interest rate 1.8 -0.1 -0.1 -1.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0
Business confidence 1.7 1.5 -0.1 1.7 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0
Policy uncertainty … … 1.7 -6.6 -2.4 … … -6.1 7.5 0.7 3.8
Policies
Government expenditure 4.1 1.7 5.0 2.3 3.3 4.1 2.9 3.8 2.3 3.3 4.8
Policy rate 0.1 -1.9 -1.0 0.0 -0.7 0.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.1 -0.3 0.0
All 
years
Global recoveries (initial years) Global recoveries (first three years)
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Table 7. Main features of global recoveries (by country group) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in unemployment rates and policy rate, in which percentage-point 
changes of these variables are reported. See footnote of Table 6. 
 
 
  
1976 1983 1992 2010 Average 1976-78 1983-85 1992-94 2010-12 Average
Advanced economies
Output 4.8 3.1 2.0 2.9 3.2 4.2 3.8 2.1 1.9 3.0 3.3
Output per capita 3.9 2.4 1.3 2.3 2.5 3.5 3.2 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.4
Industrial production 7.8 2.3 -0.3 7.6 4.3 5.5 3.9 1.3 3.4 3.5 3.0
Trade 10.7 2.8 5.0 12.0 7.6 7.2 5.8 5.5 6.5 6.3 5.9
Unemployment rate 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0
Output (PPP) 4.9 3.2 2.1 3.0 3.3 4.3 3.9 2.2 2.0 3.1 3.3
Output per capita (PPP) 4.1 2.5 1.4 2.4 2.6 3.6 3.2 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.5
Credit 3.6 4.7 1.7 -1.2 2.2 4.5 5.9 1.8 -0.6 2.9 4.7
Government expenditure 3.4 2.8 5.1 0.4 2.9 3.9 3.1 3.1 -0.1 2.5 4.2
Policy rate 0.1 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.7 0.2 -1.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.4 0.0
EMDEs
Output 6.7 1.6 0.9 7.4 4.2 5.0 2.8 2.1 6.3 4.0 4.7
Output per capita 4.5 -0.5 -0.8 6.0 2.3 2.9 0.7 0.5 4.9 2.2 2.8
Industrial production … … 1.4 11.0 6.2 … … 3.6 7.9 5.7 5.0
Trade 4.6 -1.2 0.5 13.2 4.3 5.1 1.4 5.0 9.8 5.3 5.6
Unemployment rate … -0.5 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 … -0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Output (PPP) 6.7 2.2 1.4 7.5 4.5 5.0 2.9 2.4 6.3 4.2 4.8
Output per capita (PPP) 4.6 0.2 -0.3 6.1 2.6 2.9 0.9 0.7 4.9 2.3 2.9
Credit 6.0 -6.8 15.8 12.5 6.9 3.3 -0.2 13.8 12.4 7.3 7.8
Government expenditure 12.0 -5.2 4.7 6.0 4.4 6.9 2.0 6.3 6.7 5.5 5.8
Policy rate 0.2 -0.2 -1.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
LICs
Output 0.9 1.3 -1.7 6.9 1.9 0.7 2.0 -0.4 6.4 2.2 3.8
Output per capita -1.5 -1.4 -4.5 4.0 -0.8 -1.7 -0.8 -3.3 3.5 -0.6 1.1
Trade -2.3 0.9 -6.3 15.1 1.8 4.7 7.9 -0.8 13.8 6.4 6.0
Output (PPP) 1.3 1.4 -1.3 7.2 2.1 1.0 2.1 0.0 6.3 2.3 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) -1.1 -1.4 -4.1 4.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.7 -2.9 3.3 -0.4 1.2
Global recoveries (initial years) Global recoveries (first three years) All 
years
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Table 8. Main features of global recoveries (by region) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes. See footnote of Table 6. Regional aggregates include EMDEs only. 
 
  
1976 1983 1992 2010 Average 1976-78 1983-85 1992-94 2010-12 Average
East Asia and Pacific
Output 3.4 7.5 10.9 9.8 7.9 6.7 8.3 11.0 8.6 8.6 7.0
Output per capita 1.4 5.8 9.5 8.9 6.4 4.8 6.5 9.6 7.8 7.2 5.4
Industrial production … … 10.4 14.5 12.5 … … 13.0 11.6 12.3 9.9
Trade 2.6 7.7 16.0 18.1 11.1 8.6 9.3 17.8 12.3 12.0 8.6
Output (PPP) 3.9 7.1 10.5 9.6 7.8 6.8 7.8 10.6 8.4 8.4 6.9
Output per capita (PPP) 1.9 5.4 9.0 8.8 6.3 4.9 6.0 9.2 7.6 6.9 5.3
Europe and Central Asia
Output 6.1 4.3 -9.4 4.6 1.4 4.9 2.7 -7.3 4.6 1.2 3.2
Output per capita 5.2 3.4 -9.8 4.2 0.8 4.0 1.9 -7.6 4.1 0.6 2.6
Industrial production … … -1.7 9.5 3.9 … … -0.7 7.6 3.4 3.3
Trade 5.9 0.9 -22.4 11.9 -0.9 6.8 5.3 -7.1 8.4 3.3 5.0
Output (PPP) 6.1 4.3 -9.8 4.5 1.3 4.9 2.7 -7.8 4.4 1.1 3.2
Output per capita (PPP) 5.2 3.4 -10.1 4.2 0.7 4.0 1.9 -8.1 4.1 0.5 2.6
Latin America and the Caribbean
Output 6.0 -2.5 2.5 6.7 3.2 4.8 1.8 4.0 4.6 3.8 3.9
Output per capita 3.5 -4.6 0.7 5.5 1.3 2.4 -0.4 2.2 3.5 1.9 1.8
Industrial production … … 0.6 7.9 4.2 … … 4.2 3.2 3.7 1.7
Trade 1.9 -5.3 12.1 17.6 6.6 5.1 1.6 10.5 9.8 6.8 5.5
Output (PPP) 5.4 -2.4 2.9 6.7 3.1 4.6 1.6 4.2 4.7 3.8 3.8
Output per capita (PPP) 3.0 -4.5 1.0 5.5 1.2 2.2 -0.6 2.3 3.5 1.9 1.8
Middle East and North Africa
Output 15.7 -1.5 5.8 4.8 6.2 6.1 -0.4 3.2 4.5 3.3 5.0
Output per capita 12.5 -4.8 3.5 2.6 3.4 3.1 -3.7 1.1 2.1 0.7 2.4
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade 6.2 -3.9 6.6 1.3 2.6 2.4 -7.0 2.3 4.8 0.6 5.1
Output (PPP) 15.6 -0.5 5.3 4.1 6.1 5.9 0.1 2.9 3.4 3.1 4.9
Output per capita (PPP) 12.4 -3.8 3.0 2.0 3.4 2.9 -3.2 0.7 1.3 0.4 2.4
South Asia
Output 2.3 6.7 5.3 9.6 6.0 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.3 5.7 5.0
Output per capita -0.1 4.1 3.1 8.0 3.8 2.5 2.9 3.1 5.8 3.6 3.0
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade 8.0 9.0 14.6 14.6 11.6 9.3 4.4 12.7 13.7 10.0 6.6
Output (PPP) 2.3 6.7 5.3 9.6 6.0 5.0 5.5 5.3 7.2 5.7 5.0
Output per capita (PPP) -0.1 4.2 3.1 8.0 3.8 2.5 3.0 3.1 5.8 3.6 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Output 4.9 -1.5 -0.8 6.5 2.3 2.3 1.2 0.3 5.2 2.3 3.8
Output per capita 2.1 -4.3 -3.5 3.7 -0.5 -0.4 -1.7 -2.5 2.4 -0.6 1.1
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade -1.0 -7.2 -3.8 7.4 -1.2 4.1 -0.9 3.5 6.3 3.2 4.3
Output (PPP) 5.1 -1.5 -0.6 6.8 2.5 2.5 1.2 0.3 5.3 2.3 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) 2.3 -4.3 -3.4 4.0 -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -2.5 2.5 -0.5 1.1
Global recoveries (first three years) All 
years
Global recoveries (initial years)
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Table 9. Main features of global expansions 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in capital flows, unemployment rates, inflation, nominal and real 
interest rates, and policy rate, in which percentage-point changes of these variables are reported. “All years” refers 
to averages during 1950-2019. “…” indicates that data are either unavailable or aggregates are not computed due to 
small sample size. For details, see Appendix 2. 
 
  
1976-81 1983-90 1992-2008 2010-19 Average 1977-81 1984-90 1993-2008 2011-19 Average
Activity
Output 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.7
Output per capita 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.0
Industrial production 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.9 3.2 2.8 3.7 3.0 2.3 2.9 3.5
Trade 5.1 5.2 6.7 4.7 5.4 4.4 5.7 6.9 3.9 5.2 5.8
Unemployment rate 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Oil consumption 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.7 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.3
Investment 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.6 2.9 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.6 4.4
Consumption 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.1 3.6
Output (PPP) 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 4.0
Output per capita (PPP) 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.3
Financial markets
Capital flows 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.2
Credit 3.6 6.5 4.1 3.3 4.4 3.6 6.8 4.2 3.5 4.5 5.2
Equity prices -1.7 16.6 8.9 5.3 7.3 -2.5 15.6 8.8 3.9 6.5 5.3
House prices 1.6 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.0 3.2 1.9 1.6 2.2 1.8
Financial conditions 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1
Inflation -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty
Nominal interest rate 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Real interest rate 1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Business confidence 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Policy uncertainty … 0.1 2.7 6.3 3.0 … 0.1 2.8 7.7 3.5 3.8
Policies
Government expenditure 4.2 3.0 4.1 2.8 3.5 4.3 3.2 4.0 2.9 3.6 4.8
Policy rate 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Global expansions Global expansions (excluding initial years) All 
years
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Table 10. Main features of global expansions (by country group) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes, except in unemployment rates and policy rate, in which percentage-point 
changes of these variables are reported. See footnote of Table 9. 
 
  
1976-81 1983-90 1992-2008 2010-19 Average 1977-81 1984-90 1993-2008 2011-19 Average
Advanced economies
Output 3.3 3.7 2.5 1.9 2.9 3.0 3.8 2.5 1.8 2.8 3.3
Output per capita 2.6 3.1 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.3 3.2 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.4
Industrial production 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.8 2.7 2.7 3.7 2.1 1.2 2.4 3.0
Trade 5.6 6.4 6.1 4.3 5.6 4.6 6.9 6.2 3.4 5.3 5.9
Unemployment rate 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0
Output (PPP) 3.4 3.8 2.6 2.0 2.9 3.1 3.8 2.6 1.9 2.8 3.3
Output per capita (PPP) 2.6 3.1 1.9 1.5 2.3 2.3 3.2 2.0 1.4 2.2 2.5
Credit 3.5 6.8 3.4 1.2 3.7 3.5 7.1 3.5 1.5 3.9 4.7
Government expenditure 3.9 3.3 2.9 1.1 2.8 4.1 3.3 2.8 1.2 2.8 4.2
Policy rate 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.1 1.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0
EMDEs
Output 4.0 3.0 4.7 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.2 4.9 4.6 4.0 4.7
Output per capita 2.0 0.9 3.2 3.5 2.4 1.4 1.1 3.4 3.3 2.3 2.8
Industrial production … … 5.6 5.1 5.3 … … 5.8 4.4 5.1 5.0
Trade 4.2 2.3 8.1 5.5 5.0 4.1 2.8 8.6 4.7 5.0 5.6
Unemployment rate -2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -2.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Output (PPP) 4.0 3.2 4.8 5.1 4.3 3.4 3.3 5.1 4.9 4.2 4.8
Output per capita (PPP) 1.9 1.1 3.3 3.8 2.5 1.4 1.2 3.6 3.6 2.4 2.9
Credit 6.1 0.8 10.4 10.1 6.9 6.1 1.9 10.1 9.9 7.0 7.8
Government expenditure 6.8 1.4 7.1 5.7 5.3 5.8 2.4 7.2 5.7 5.3 5.8
Policy rate 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
LICs
Output 1.3 2.5 4.0 5.9 3.4 1.4 2.6 4.3 5.8 3.5 3.8
Output per capita -1.1 -0.4 1.1 3.0 0.6 -1.1 -0.3 1.5 2.9 0.7 1.1
Trade 1.7 4.5 7.4 8.8 5.6 2.5 5.0 8.2 8.2 6.0 6.0
Output (PPP) 1.6 2.6 4.2 6.1 3.6 1.6 2.8 4.5 6.0 3.7 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) -0.9 -0.3 1.3 3.1 0.8 -0.8 -0.1 1.6 3.0 0.9 1.2
Global expansions Global expansions (excluding initial years) All 
years
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Table 11. Main features of global expansions (by region) 
 
Note: All variables show percent changes. See footnote of Table 9. Regional aggregates include EMDEs only. 
 
  
1976-81 1983-90 1992-2008 2010-19 Average 1977-81 1984-90 1993-2008 2011-19 Average
East Asia and Pacific
Output 6.8 8.0 8.7 7.1 7.6 7.5 8.0 8.5 6.8 7.7 7.0
Output per capita 5.0 6.0 7.6 6.3 6.2 5.7 6.1 7.5 6.1 6.3 5.4
Industrial production … 12.7 10.4 8.0 10.4 … 12.7 10.4 7.3 10.1 9.9
Trade 10.2 10.1 12.5 7.2 10.0 11.7 10.4 12.2 6.0 10.1 8.6
Output (PPP) 6.8 7.7 8.3 7.0 7.5 7.4 7.8 8.2 6.7 7.6 6.9
Output per capita (PPP) 5.0 5.8 7.3 6.3 6.1 5.7 5.8 7.2 6.0 6.2 5.3
Europe and Central Asia
Output 2.8 1.9 2.2 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.6 2.9 3.0 2.4 3.2
Output per capita 1.9 1.1 2.1 2.7 1.9 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.5 1.8 2.6
Industrial production … … 3.5 4.2 3.9 … … 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.3
Trade 4.5 1.0 6.2 5.0 4.2 4.3 1.0 8.0 4.2 4.4 5.0
Output (PPP) 2.8 1.9 2.1 3.0 2.4 2.1 1.5 2.8 2.9 2.3 3.2
Output per capita (PPP) 1.9 1.1 2.0 2.6 1.9 1.2 0.7 2.7 2.5 1.8 2.6
Latin America and the Caribbean
Output 4.9 2.0 3.2 2.2 3.1 4.7 2.6 3.3 1.7 3.1 3.9
Output per capita 2.5 -0.1 1.7 1.1 1.3 2.3 0.6 1.8 0.6 1.3 1.8
Industrial production … … 3.0 0.5 1.7 … … 3.1 -0.4 1.4 1.7
Trade 7.5 4.6 7.2 4.6 6.0 8.6 6.1 6.9 3.2 6.2 5.5
Output (PPP) 4.8 1.9 3.2 2.4 3.1 4.7 2.5 3.3 1.9 3.1 3.8
Output per capita (PPP) 2.4 -0.2 1.7 1.2 1.3 2.3 0.4 1.8 0.8 1.3 1.8
Middle East and North Africa
Output 4.5 1.8 4.1 3.0 3.3 2.3 2.3 4.0 2.8 2.8 5.0
Output per capita 1.4 -1.3 2.2 0.9 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 2.1 0.7 0.3 2.4
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade 0.7 0.0 5.4 3.0 2.3 -0.4 0.6 5.3 3.2 2.2 5.1
Output (PPP) 4.1 2.0 4.0 2.6 3.2 1.8 2.3 3.9 2.5 2.6 4.9
Output per capita (PPP) 1.0 -1.1 2.1 0.7 0.7 -1.3 -0.7 2.1 0.5 0.1 2.4
South Asia
Output 4.1 5.6 6.1 6.8 5.7 4.5 5.4 6.2 6.5 5.6 5.0
Output per capita 1.6 3.1 4.2 5.5 3.6 2.0 3.0 4.2 5.2 3.6 3.0
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade 7.2 5.1 13.0 6.9 8.0 7.0 4.5 12.9 6.1 7.6 6.6
Output (PPP) 4.1 5.6 6.1 6.8 5.7 4.5 5.4 6.2 6.5 5.7 5.0
Output per capita (PPP) 1.7 3.2 4.2 5.5 3.6 2.0 3.0 4.3 5.2 3.6 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Output 2.5 2.2 4.0 3.7 3.1 2.0 2.7 4.3 3.4 3.1 3.8
Output per capita -0.2 -0.7 1.3 0.9 0.3 -0.7 -0.2 1.6 0.6 0.3 1.1
Industrial production … … … … … … … … … … …
Trade 3.9 1.0 7.2 3.6 3.9 4.9 2.2 7.9 3.1 4.5 4.3
Output (PPP) 2.5 2.3 4.1 3.9 3.2 2.0 2.9 4.4 3.6 3.2 3.9
Output per capita (PPP) -0.3 -0.6 1.4 1.1 0.4 -0.8 -0.1 1.7 0.8 0.4 1.1
Global expansions Global expansions (excluding initial years) All 
years
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Appendix 1. List of countries in the database 
 
Advanced economies (36) 
Australia Hong Kong SAR, China New Zealand 
Austria Iceland Norway 
Belgium Ireland Portugal 
Canada Israel Singapore 
Cyprus Italy Slovak Republic 
Czech Republic Japan Slovenia 
Denmark Korea, Rep. Spain 
Estonia Latvia Sweden 
Finland Lithuania Switzerland 
France Luxembourg Taiwan, China 
Germany Malta United Kingdom 
Greece Netherlands United States 
 
Emerging market and developing economies (144) 
East Asia and Pacific (22) 
Cambodia* Micronesia, Fed. Sts.* Thailand 
China Mongolia Timor-Leste* 
Fiji* Myanmar* Tonga* 
Indonesia Palau* Tuvalu* 
Kiribati* Papua New Guinea* Vanuatu* 
Lao PDR* Philippines Vietnam 
Malaysia Samoa*  
Marshall Islands* Solomon Islands*  
 
Europe and Central Asia (24) 
Albania Hungary Romania 
Armenia* Kazakhstan Russian Federation 
Azerbaijan Kosovo* Serbia 
Belarus Kyrgyz Republic* Tajikistan* 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Moldova Turkey 
Bulgaria Montenegro Turkmenistan* 
Croatia North Macedonia Ukraine 
Georgia Poland Uzbekistan* 
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Latin America and the Caribbean (30) 
Antigua and Barbuda* Dominican Republic Panama 
Argentina Ecuador Paraguay 
Bahamas, The* El Salvador Peru 
Barbados* Grenada* St. Kitts and Nevis* 
Belize Guatemala St. Lucia* 
Bolivia Guyana* St. Vincent and the Grenadines* 
Brazil Haiti* Suriname* 
Chile Honduras Uruguay 
Colombia Jamaica*  
Costa Rica Mexico  
Dominica* Nicaragua  
 
Middle East and North Africa (16) 
Algeria* Jordan Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain Kuwait Tunisia 
Djibouti* Lebanon* United Arab Emirates 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Morocco West Bank and Gaza 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman*  
Iraq* Qatar  
 
South Asia (8) 
Afghanistan* India Pakistan* 
Bangladesh* Maldives* Sri Lanka 
Bhutan* Nepal*  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 
Angola* Ethiopia* Namibia 
Benin* Gabon* Niger* 
Botswana Gambia, The* Nigeria 
Burkina Faso* Ghana Rwanda* 
Burundi* Guinea* Senegal 
Cabo Verde* Guinea-Bissau* Seychelles* 
Cameroon Kenya Sierra Leone* 
Chad* Lesotho South Africa 
Comoros* Liberia* Sudan* 
Congo, Dem. Rep.* Madagascar* Tanzania 
Congo, Rep.* Malawi* Togo* 
Côte d’Ivoire Mali* Uganda 
Equatorial Guinea* Mauritania* Zambia 
Eritrea* Mauritius* Zimbabwe* 
Eswatini* Mozambique  
Note: The number of countries is in parentheses next to the country group name. Those in italics are low-income 
countries (based on the World Bank classification for FY2020). Those with * are not included in the quarterly series. 
The quarterly data are available in 106 countries. 
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Appendix 2. Definitions and sources of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Economic activity  
Output GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (market weighted), taken from the World Bank. Prior to 1960, the 
series is extended using data from the Penn World Tables 9.1 (PWT 9.1). Sample includes 180 
countries, including 36 advanced economies and 144 EMDEs. For PPP-weighted series, GDP is in 
constant 2010 international dollars. 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015); World 
Bank. 
Output per 
capita 
GDP per capita, in constant 2010 U.S. dollars (market weighted), taken from the World Bank. Prior 
to 1960, both GDP and population series are extended using data from PWT 9.1. Sample includes 180 
countries. For PPP-weighted series, GDP per capita is in constant 2010 international dollars. 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015); World 
Bank. 
Industrial 
production 
Industrial production index (if not available, manufacturing production index is used). Data are 
obtained at a quarterly frequency and used as annual averages of year-on-year growth rates. For 
aggregated groups, market-weighted output is used as a weight. The main source of the series is the 
World Bank and, for countries and quarters without data, the series is extended using growth rates of 
data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Haver 
Analytics. 
Haver Analytics, OECD, 
World Bank. 
Trade Exports plus imports of goods and services, in constant 2010 U.S. dollars, taken from the World Bank. 
Prior to 1960, the series of exports and imports are extended using data from PWT 9.1. Trade for 
aggregated groups is the sum of exports and imports of individual countries. 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015); World 
Bank. 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment, in percent of labor force, taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data 
for aggregated groups are computed as the sum of those unemployed in individual countries divided by 
the sum of labor force. 
IMF. 
Oil consumption Oil consumption, in thousand barrels per day. Oil consumption in advanced economies and EMDEs is 
computed as the sum of consumption in individual countries. If there are differences between the 
world total and the sum of advanced economies and EMDEs, the residuals are added to the EMDE 
aggregate. The number of world oil consumption for 2019 is based on data over the first nine months 
of the year. 
British Petroleum, U.S. 
Energy Information 
Administration. 
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Appendix 2. Definitions and sources of variables (continued) 
Variable Definition Source 
Financial market  
Capital flows Total capital flows, defined as the sum of absolute values of outflows (net acquisition of financial asset, 
including direct, portfolio, and other assets) and inflows (net incurrence of liabilities, including direct, 
portfolio, and other liabilities), in current U.S. dollars, taken from the IMF Balance of Payments 
Statistics (sixth edition). The figures for 2019 show data over the first two quarters of the year. For 
the historical series, the statistics based on the fifth edition are also used. The series is shown as a 
percent of GDP, which is taken from the World Bank and PWT 9.1. 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015); IMF; 
World Bank. 
Credit Nominal credit provided by banks and other financial corporations, deflated by the consumer price 
index (CPI). Data are at a quarterly frequency and shown as annual averages of year-on-year growth 
of real credit. Nominal credit series is taken from the IMF (International Financial Statistics: IFS), 
titled claims on private sector (by depository or financial corporations), and the Bank for International 
Settlements. CPI is taken from the Bank for International Settlements, Haver Analytics, and the IMF. 
Credit for aggregated groups is computed as follows. First, real credit (in local currency) is converted 
to constant 2010 U.S. dollars, and then U.S.-dollar real credit in individual countries is aggregated into 
respective groups. 
Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, IMF. 
Equity prices Share price index, deflated by CPI. Data are at a quarterly frequency and used as annual averages of 
year-on-year growth of real equity prices. Data are from the IMF (IFS) and Haver Analytics and 
available as period averages and end-of-period values. The one with longer data availability is used as 
the main series. Growth in aggregated groups is computed with market-weighted output as a weight. 
CPI is taken from the Bank for International Settlements, Haver Analytics, and the IMF. 
Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, IMF, World 
Bank. 
House prices House (or property) prices, deflated by CPI. Data are at a quarterly frequency and used as annual 
averages of year-on-year growth of real house prices. Data are from the Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver Analytics, and OECD. Growth in aggregated groups is computed with market-
weighted output as a weight. CPI is taken from the Bank for International Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, and the IMF. 
Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, IMF, OECD, 
World Bank. 
Financial 
conditions 
An index of financial conditions, computed as a weighted average of short-term and long-term interest 
rates, trade-weighted dollar, an index of credit spreads, and the ratio of equity prices to the 10-year 
average of earnings per share, as explained in Hatzius and Stehn (2018). Higher index numbers reflect 
tighter financial conditions. Data are at a monthly frequency and used as annual averages of year-on-
year growth of the index. Growth in aggregated groups is computed with market-weighted output as a 
weight. 
Bloomberg, Goldman 
Sachs, World Bank. 
Inflation Change in CPI in percent. Data are at a quarterly frequency and used as annual averages of year-on-
year percent changes of CPI. The series is taken from the Bank for International Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, and the IMF. Inflation in aggregated groups is computed with market-weighted output as a 
weight. In order to eliminate an effect of countries with a history of high inflation, countries whose 
average inflation over the entire sample period (based on quarterly data) is above the top 20th 
percentile, are excluded.  
Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, IMF, World 
Bank. 
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Appendix 2. Definitions and sources of variables (continued) 
Variable Definition Source 
Interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty  
Shor-term 
interest rate 
(nominal and 
real) 
Treasury bill rates or money market rates, with the maturity of three months or less. In countries 
where 3-month rates are unavailable, shorter maturity rates (including overnight rates) are used. Data 
are at a quarterly frequency and used as annual averages. The real short-term interest rate is the 
difference between nominal rate and inflation in the following quarter (as a proxy of expected 
inflation). Data are taken from different sources, and the data series with the longest time coverage is 
used as the main series. Then, the main series is spliced with those from other data sources. Data for 
aggregated groups are computed with market-weighted output as a weight. 
Bank for International 
Settlements, Haver 
Analytics, IMF, OECD, 
World Bank. 
Business 
confidence 
Business confidence index, originally taken from the European Commission, OECD, and country 
sources (including statistical offices, central banks, academic institutions, and think tanks). The series 
is obtained as quarterly data and used as annual averages. Data from different sources are first 
standardized and converted to an index equal to 100 in 2015-18. Confidence for aggregated groups is 
computed with market-weighted output as a weight. 
European Commission, 
OECD, country sources, 
World Bank. 
Policy 
uncertainty 
Economic policy uncertainty index, which is based on the frequency of articles in domestic newspapers 
mentioning economic policy uncertainty. Country-level indices are at a monthly frequency and used as 
annual averages. Data are first converted to a 6-month moving average and then an index equal to 
100 in 2015-18. Aggregated policy uncertainty is computed with market-weighted output as a weight, 
based on 20 countries with available data. 
Davis (2016); World 
Bank. 
Policies  
Government 
expenditure 
Government primary expenditure (i.e., government total expenditure excluding interest expense) in 
local currency, deflated by GDP deflator. The expenditure series is first taken from the IMF and then 
extended with data in Mauro et al. (2015). GDP deflator is taken from the IMF, PWT 9.1, and the 
World Bank. Real government expenditure growth in aggregated groups is computed with market-
weighted output as a weight. 
IMF; Mauro et al. (2015); 
World Bank. 
Policy interest 
rate 
Nominal central bank policy rates. Data are at a quarterly frequency and used as annual averages. 
Data are taken from different sources, and the data series with the longest time coverage is used as the 
main series. Then, the main series is spliced with those from other data sources. Data for aggregated 
groups are computed with market-weighted output as a weight. 
Bank for International 
Settlements; Haver 
Analytics; IMF; OECD; 
World Bank. 
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Appendix 2. Definitions and sources of variables (continued) 
Variable Definition Source 
Quarterly series  
Output (per 
capita) growth 
Quarterly real GDP is taken from Haver Analytics and OECD. Quarter-on-quarter annualized growth 
rates of seasonally-adjusted real GDP are computed. If the original data are not seasonally-adjusted, 
the U.S. Census X-13 program is used to perform seasonal adjustment first. Quarterly growth for 
aggregated groups is computed with market-weighted annual output as a weight—the same weights 
are applied to four quarters in given years. In computing per capita growth, population data are used 
on an annual basis and taken from the World Bank and PWT, and therefore, the same population 
growth numbers are used in four quarters in given years. As a result, output per capita growth is 
calculated as the difference between aggregated annualized quarterly GDP growth and annual 
population growth. When computing growth rates over two quarters with different samples, countries 
are restricted to the common samples between these two quarters and with GDP and population. 
Sample includes 106 countries, though the sample size varies by quarter, over 1960:1-2019:3. Data for 
the 1950s are excluded, due to the limited data availability. 
Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015); Haver 
Analytics; OECD; World 
Bank. 
Note: Country-group aggregates are not computed, if the sample size is limited—specifically, data need to be available at least for 10 countries in all variables 
except in financial conditions, short-term interest rates, business confidence, policy uncertainty, and policy interest rates (at least 4 countries, because of more 
limited data availability in the original series). The sample coverage mentioned in the table is the maximum number of countries and the sample size varies by 
year or quarter. Figures A2.1 to A2.4 display time series data of global aggregate. Output from other data sources is also utilized for comparison purposes: the 
IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2019) has annual data available since 1980 and the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database has 
annual data starting in 1970. 
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Figure A2.1. Global activity 
A. Output growth B. Output per capita growth 
  
C. Industrial production growth D. Trade growth 
  
E. Unemployment rate F. Oil consumption growth 
  
Sources: British Petroleum; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; 
Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Aggregates for output, output per capita, and industrial production are market-weighted. Shaded areas indicate 
global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 2012. World aggregates 
are not computed if data are available in less than 10 countries. 
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Figure A2.2. Global financial markets 
A. Capital flows B. Credit 
  
C. Equity prices D. House prices 
  
E. Financial conditions index F. Inflation 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Kose and 
Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Equity prices, house prices, financial conditions index, and inflation are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. 
Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 
2012. World aggregates are not computed if data are available in less than 10 countries (in Panels A to D, and F) 
and 4 countries (in Panel E). 
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Figure A2.3. Global interest rates, confidence, and uncertainty 
A. Nominal interest rates B. Real interest rates 
  
C. Business confidence D. Policy uncertainty 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Davis (2016); European Commission; Haver Analytics; International 
Monetary Fund; Kose and Terrones (2015); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; country 
sources; World Bank. 
Note: Variables are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, 
and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 2012. World aggregates are not computed if data are 
available in less than 4 countries. 
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Figure A2.4. Global policies 
A. Government expenditure B. Policy interest rate 
  
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Haver Analytics; International Monetary Fund; Mauro et al. (2015); 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank. 
Note: Variables are weighted by GDP in U.S. dollars. Shaded areas indicate global recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, 
and 2009, and global downturns in 1958, 1998, 2001, and 2012. World aggregates are not computed if data are 
available in less than 10 countries (Panel A) and 4 countries (Panel B). 
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Appendix 3. Identification of business cycle turning points 
 
The dating method introduced by Harding and Pagan (2002) requires a search for maxima 
and minima over a given period of time. Then, it selects pairs of adjacent, locally absolute 
maxima and minima that meet certain censoring rules. Specifically, a peak in per-capita 
global GDP, yt, occurs at time t if: 
 
( ) ( )
-1 1  t t t ty y and y y +> <  
 
Similarly, a cyclical trough occurs at time t if: 
 
( ) ( )
-1 1  t t t ty y and y y +< >  
 
With annual data, the methodology requires a minimum three-year duration of a cycle 
and a minimum one-year duration of each of the cyclical phases. A complete cycle goes 
from one peak to the next peak with its two phases, the recession phase (from peak to 
trough) and the expansion phase (from trough to the next peak). These rules apply to 
world per capita GDP using market weights. 
 
With quarterly data, a minimum five-quarter duration of a cycle and a minimum two-
quarter duration of each of the cyclical phases are chosen (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 
2012). 
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Appendix 4. List of years with the worst records of global activity (1950-2019) 
 
Note: The table lists the 20 worst annual prints of each variable since 1950. The ranking is based on percent changes 
in all variables, except the unemployment rate, in which percentage-point changes are considered. These years are 
identified by simply sorting each variable in descending order, except the unemployment rate (in ascending order). 
Years in bold and italics refer to those of global recessions and global downturns, respectively. For details, see 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
Output 
Output per 
capita 
Industrial 
production Trade 
Unemployment 
rate
Oil 
consumption Investment Consumption 
Output 
(PPP)
Output per 
capita (PPP)
1 2009 2009 2009 2009 1975 1980 2009 2009 2009 2009
2 1982 1982 1975 1982 2009 1981 1952 1981 1982 1982
3 1975 1975 1982 1975 1970 1982 1992 1982 1991 1975
4 1991 1991 1958 1958 1974 1974 1982 2008 1975 1991
5 1993 1980 2001 1952 1971 2009 1991 1991 1992 1980
6 1992 1993 2008 2001 1991 1975 1993 1974 1980 1992
7 1980 1981 1992 2019 2002 2008 1974 1980 1993 1981
8 2008 1992 1991 1983 1982 1983 1981 1993 1981 1993
9 1981 1958 1981 1980 1992 1993 1958 2012 2001 1958
10 2001 1974 1993 2016 1993 1991 2001 2019 1998 1990
11 1958 2008 1974 1985 1990 1998 1975 2013 1990 1983
12 2002 2001 1980 1981 1995 1985 2002 2015 1958 1998
13 1974 1990 2015 2015 1998 2019 1980 2002 1983 2001
14 2019 1983 2019 2012 2001 2014 1983 1975 2019 1974
15 2012 2002 2016 2008 1980 2000 2008 2014 2002 1985
16 1990 1998 2002 1991 1977 2012 1990 1992 2008 1954
17 1998 2012 1990 1986 1994 2011 2019 2003 1985 2002
18 2016 2019 1983 2013 2003 2001 1998 2001 1974 1994
19 2013 1954 2012 1993 1999 2002 2016 2011 1994 2008
20 1983 2013 1986 2002 1989 1990 1985 2016 1954 1986
